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I. INTRODUCTION'
The current system of taxing the income of multinational firms in the
United States is flawed across multiple dimensions. The system provides an
artificial tax incentive to earn income in low-tax countries, rewards
aggressive tax planning, and is not compatible with any common metrics of
efficiency. The U.S. system is also notoriously complex; observers are nearly
unanimous in lamenting the heavy compliance burdens and the impracticality
of coherent enforcement. Further, despite a corporate tax rate one standard
deviation above that of other OECD countries, the U.S. corporate tax system
raises relatively little revenue, due in part to the shifting of income outside
the U.S. tax base.
In this proposal, we advocate moving to a system of formulary
apportionment for taxing the corporate income of multinational firms. Under
our proposal, the U.S. tax base for multinational corporations would be
calculated based on a fraction of their worldwide incomes. This fraction
would be the sum of (1) a fixed return on their expenses in the United States
and (2) the share of their worldwide sales that occur in the United States.
This system is similar in significant respects to the current "residual profit
split" method of the U.S. transfer pricing regulations and the OECD
Guidelines, as well as to the current method that U.S. states use to allocate
national income across states.2 The state system arose due to the widespread
belief that it was impractical to account separately for the economic activity
supposedly earned in each state when states are highly integrated
economically. Similarly, in an increasingly global world economy, it is
difficult to assign profits to individual countries, and attempts to do so are
fraught with opportunities for tax avoidance.
Under our proposed apportionment system, firms would have far
fewer incentives to shift income to low-tax locations. This would help
protect the U.S. tax base while reducing the distortionary features of the
current tax system. In addition, the complexity and administrative burden of
the system would be reduced. The proposed system would be both better
1. Parts of this paper incorporate Reuven Avi-Yonah and Kimberly
Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt
Formulary Apportionment, in Path to Prosperity: Hamilton Project Ideas on Income
Security, Education, and Taxes, Furman and Bordorff, eds. Brookings Institution
(2008), pp319-44; also in 2007 TNT 114-38 (Jun. 13, 2007), and Michael Durst, A
Statutory Proposal for U.S. Transfer Pricing Reform, Tax Notes Int'l 1041 (June 4,
2007). The authors acknowledge valuable feedback from Rosanne Altshuler, Mihir
Desai, Jon Talisman, Michael Knoll, Reed Shuldiner, Chris Sanchirico, Joann
Weiner, Diane Ring, Yariv Brauner, Joseph Guttentag, Philip West, and the
Hamilton Project staff, especially Peter Orszag, Jason Bordoff, and Michael Deich.
2. We should note, however, that our proposal is significantly different
from current state tax law, in ways discussed below.
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suited to an integrated world economy and more compatible with the tax
policy goals of efficiency, equity, and simplicity.
The following section will discuss the current U.S. system and
describe its flaws. Section III will describe our proposed formulary
apportionment system, discuss its advantages, and clarify how the proposal
addresses the flaws of the current system. Section IV will address potential
hurdles and problems associated with formulary apportionment, including
implementation issues. Section V will conclude, briefly contrasting this
proposal with other reform suggestions.
H. THE U.S. SYSTEM OF CORPORATE TAXATION
Under the current tax system, multinational firms (both resident and
non-resident) pay tax to the U.S. government based on the income that they
report earning in the United States. As is typical, the United States employs a
separate accounting (SA) system, under which firms account for income and
expenses in each country separately. The current U.S. tax rate is 35%.
Figure IA shows the evolution of corporate tax rates for OECD countries
over the past quarter century. As is clear from this diagram, the U.S.
statutory corporate tax rate has been increasing relative to other OECD
countries over the previous 15 years, and it is now one standard deviation
higher than the average OECD tax rate.
The U.S. government taxes U.S. multinational firms on a residence
basis, and thus U.S. resident firms incur taxation on income earned abroad as
well as income earned in the United States. U.S. taxation is imposed only
when income is repatriated by a foreign subsidiary to the U.S. parent via a
dividend.4 Thus, a subsidiary's income can grow free of U.S. tax prior to
repatriation, a process known as deferral. Deferral provides strong incentives
to earn income in low-tax countries.
As an example, consider a U.S. based multinational firm that
operates a subsidiary in Ireland. Assume that the U.S. corporate income tax
rate is 35% while the Irish corporate income tax rate is 12.5%. The Irish
subsidiary earns £800 and decides to repatriate E70 of the profits to the
United States. (Assume, for ease of computation only, a 1:1 exchange rate.)
First, the Irish affiliate pays E100 to the Irish government on profits of E800.
3. The trends for average effective tax rates are similar. See Figure 1, panel
B.
4. The subpart F provisions of U.S. tax law prevent some firms from taking
full advantage of deferral. Under subpart F, certain foreign income of controlled
foreign corporations is subject to immediate taxation. This includes income from
passive investments. The subpart F rules, however, do not seek even to approach the
goal of eliminating the shifting of income overseas, and in fact they permit massive
levels of such shifting.
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It then repatriates $70 to the United States, using the remaining profit (E630)
to reinvest in its Irish operations. The firm must pay U.S. tax on the
repatriated income, but it is generally eligible for a tax credit of $100 (taxes
paid) times 70/700 (the ratio of dividends to after-tax profits), or $10.
Owing to deferral, the remaining profits (C630) can grow abroad tax-free
prior to repatriation.
This system creates a clear incentive to earn profits in low-tax
countries. Firms may respond by locating real activities (jobs, assets,
production) in low-tax countries. In addition, firms respond with various
legal and accounting techniques to shift profits to low-tax locations,
disproportionately to the scale of business activities in such locations. There
are multiple such ways to shift income to subsidiaries in low-tax countries.
For example, it may be advantageous for multinational firms to alter the
debtlequity ratios of affiliated firms in high and low-tax countries in order to
maximize interest deductions in high-tax countries and taxable profits in
low-tax countries. Further, multinational firms have an incentive to distort
the prices on intrafirm transactions in order to shift income to low-tax
locations. For example, firms can follow a strategy of under- (over-) pricing
intrafirm exports (imports) to (from) low-tax countries, following the
opposite strategy with respect to high-tax countries. The most powerful of
such techniques typically involve the transfer of interests in intangible
property, such as patents, copyrights and trademarks as well as unpatented
know-how, to subsidiaries in low-tax countries.
In theory, firms should be limited in their ability to engage in tax-
motivated transfer pricing by government enforcement of existing transfer
pricing laws. Governments generally employ an "arm's length" standard,
requiring multinational firms to price intrafirm transactions as if they were
occurring at arm's length. Nonetheless, there is universal agreement that this
standard leaves substantial room for uncertainty as to the "correct" transfer
pricing, as arm's length prices are often difficult to establish for many
intermediate goods and services, and they are especially difficult, and
probably impossible, to estimate in cases of licenses and other transfers of
interests in unique intangible property such as a company's "crown jewel"
patents and copyrights. Further, as argued below, the arm's length standard
has become administratively unworkable in its complexity. As a result, the
arm's length standard rarely provides useful guidance regarding economic
value.
5. In general, under the U.S. tax system, when a non-U.S. subsidiary
distributes income to a U.S. parent through a dividend, the U.S. parent is entitled to a
credit, against U.S. taxes for taxes paid out of the distributed income to a foreign
government.
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A. Why "Arm's Length" Prices Do Not Successfully Benchmark
Transactions within Multinational Companies
At the heart of the SA system, with its reliance on estimated "arm's
length" prices, is the assumption that each affiliated company within the
group transacts with the other members of the group in the same way that it
would transact if the members were unrelated. That central assumption defies
reality, and it is not surprising that a system of "arm's length" pricing cannot
yield sensible results.
Most fundamentally, the SA system ignores the fact that
multinational groups of companies arise precisely in order to avoid the
inefficiencies that arise when unrelated companies must transact with one
another at arm's length. Multinational enterprises arise in large part due to
organizational and internalization advantages relative to the efforts of
unrelated, separate companies that seek to do business with one another.
Such advantages mean that within multinational enterprises, profit is
generated in part by internalizing transactions within the firm. Thus, for
firms that are truly integrated across borders, holding related entities within
the commonly controlled group to an "arms-length" standard for the pricing
of intracompany transactions does not make sense, nor does allocating
income and expenses on a country-by-country basis. In fact, a very similar
logic was behind the use of formulary apportionment (FA) for U.S. state
governments and among the Canadian provinces; in an integrated economy,
it does not make sense to attribute profits and expenses to individual
jurisdictions using separate-entity accounting.
Second, as explained above, the porosity of current transfer pricing
rules creates an artificial tax incentive to locate profits in low-tax countries,
both by locating real economic activities in such countries and by shifting
profits toward more lightly taxed locations. It is apparent that U.S.
multinational firms book disproportionate amounts of profit in low-tax
locations. For example, Figure 2 shows the ten highest-profit locations for
U.S. multinational firms in 2005, based on the share of worldwide (non-U.S.)
profits earned in each location. While some of the countries are places with a
large U.S. presence in terms of economic activity (the United Kingdom,
Canada, Germany, Japan), seven of the top-ten profit countries are locations
with very low effective tax rates.
The literature has consistently found that multinational firms are
sensitive to corporate tax rate differences across countries in their financial
decisions. Estimates from the literature suggest that the tax base responds to
changes in the corporate tax rate with an average semi-elasticity of about -2;
thus, countries with high corporate tax rates are likely to gain revenue by
lowering their tax rate.6 One recent study suggests that corporate income tax
6. See de Mooij (2005) for an overview of this literature.
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revenues in the United States were approximately 35% lower due to income
shifting in 2004.
This problem has worsened as U.S. corporate rates have become
increasingly out of line with those of other countries. In the past twenty
years, most OECD countries have lowered their corporate income tax rates,
whereas U.S. rates have been relatively constant. This increasing discrepancy
between U.S. rates and foreign rates likely results in increasing amounts of
lost revenue for the U.S. government due to strengthening income shifting
incentives.
Also, the literature suggests a substantial responsiveness of real
economic activities to tax rate differences among countries. These findings
imply both less activity in United States and less tax revenue for the U.S.
government. However, the tax responsiveness of real activity is less
immediately apparent in the data. For example, Figure 3 shows the top ten
employment locations for U.S. multinational firms in 2005, based on the
share of worldwide (non-U.S.) employment in each location. The high
employment countries are the usual suspects - large economies with close
economic ties to the United States. As the accompanying table indicates, tax
rates are not particularly low for this set of countries.
Third, the current system is absurdly complex. As Taylor (2005)
notes, observers have described the system as "a cumbersome creation of
stupefying complexity" with "rules that lack coherence and often work at
cross purposes." Altshuler and Ackerman (2005) note that observers
testifying before the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform
found the system "deeply, deeply flawed," noting that "it is difficult to
overstate the crisis in the administration of the international tax system of the
United States." Current transfer pricing rules have spawned a huge industry
of lawyers, accountants and economists whose professional role is to assist
multinational companies in their transfer pricing planning and compliance.
Fourth, particularly given the high U.S. corporate statutory tax rates,
the U.S. corporate tax system raises relatively little revenue. Figure 4 shows
the evolution of government corporate tax revenues relative to GDP for
OECD countries. For most OECD countries, revenues have increased as a
share of GDP even as corporate tax rates have declined; the average OECD
country receives about 3.25% of GDP from corporate tax revenue by the end
of the sample. Most observers attribute this trend to a broadening of the tax
base for many OECD countries during this time period. For the United
States, revenues are lower; although they fluctuate with the cyclical position
of the economy, they tend to be closer to 2.25% of GDP. There are several
7. This estimate is from Clausing (2008). The calculation is based on a
regression of U.S. multinational firm affiliate profit rates on tax rate differences
across countries. See Appendix A for more details.
8. See de Mooij (2005).
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plausible reasons for the lower amount of U.S. revenue, including the
increasingly aggressive use of corporate tax shelters, a narrower corporate
tax base, and stronger incentives for tax avoidance, which tend to increase as
the U.S. tax rate is high relative to other countries.9
Finally, it is important to note that the problems with the current
system derive not from rules at its periphery, but instead from a fallacy that
lies at the system's central core: namely, the belief that transactions among
unrelated parties can be found that are sufficiently comparable to
transactions among members of multinational groups that they can be used as
meaningful benchmarks for tax compliance and enforcement.10 For example,
if one wants to determine the "arm's length" level of profitability of a U.S.
distribution subsidiary of a foreign manufacturer of automobiles, one
identifies one or more independent U.S. distributors of automobiles operating
in economically, similar circumstances and uses the income of the
independent distributor or distributors to benchmark the income of the U.S.
subsidiary.
Such an approach might well have made sense eighty years ago,
when the legislative language underlying today's arm's length standard for
income tax purposes was first developed." At that time, although
multinational groups existed, available transportation and communications
technology did not permit close centralized management of geographically
dispersed groups. Therefore, members of multinational groups functioned
largely as independent entities, and benchmarking their incomes or
transactions based on uncontrolled comparables probably made good sense.
9. Alan Auerbach "Why Have Corporate Tax Revenues Declined? Another
Look." NBER Working Paper no. 12463. Cambridge, (Aug. 2006); also notes that
there is a declining ratio of nonfinancial C corporation profits, although he notes that
this is offset by an increasing average tax rate due to the increasing importance of tax
losses.
10. Reuven Avi-Yonah "The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the
Evolution of U.S. International Taxation." Finance and Tax Law Review 9:310
(updated version of article from 1995 Virginia Tax Rev. 15:80 (2006). This
argument is presented in detail in e.g., Stanley I. Langbein "The Unitary Method and
the Myth of Arm's Length." Tax Notes 30:625 (1986), and Michael C. Durst &
Robert E. Culbertson Clearing Away the Sand: Retrospective Methods and
Prospective Documentation in Transfer Pricing Today." Tax Law Rev. 57. 37-84
(2003).
11. For historical summaries see, e.g., Stanley 1. Langbein "The Unitary
Method and the Myth of Arm's Length." Tax Notes (1986), Rueven Avi-Yonah
"The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International
Taxation." (2006) and Michael C.Durst & Robert E. Culbertson "Clearing Away the
Sand: Retrospective Methods and Prospoective Documentation in Transfer Pricing
Today."(2003) at 42-64.
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That situation changed, however, with the technological changes
precipitated by the Second World War. Today, it is possible to exercise close
managerial control over multinational groups, and these groups develop in all
industries and geographic market segments in which the efficiencies of
common control pose significant economic advantages. Moreover, in those
industries and markets where common control poses advantages, it is
typically economically infeasible to remain in the market using a non-
commonly controlled structure (for example, by maintaining distributors that
are economically independent of manufacturers). Therefore, in those markets
in which multinational groups operate - that is, in those markets in which
transfer pricing issues arise - it is unlikely that reasonably close
"uncontrolled comparables" can be found. For example, to our knowledge,
there are no independently owned distributors of mass-market automobiles in
the United States; all of the distributors are owned by their manufacturers.12
The same is true of virtually every other industry that is conducted
on a large global scale. In sum, no matter how assiduously one performs
"functional analyses" designed to identify "uncontrolled comparables" that
are reasonably similar to members of multinational groups, one is rarely
going to find them. Certainly, such comparables will not be - and have not
been - found with sufficient regularity to serve as the basis for a workable
transfer pricing system. If the transfer pricing rules are going to be made
tolerably administrable, Congress will need to restate them on a basis other
than that of reliance on uncontrolled comparables.
The results of the current system, which assumes the availability of
useful comparables in an economic environment where they are very
unlikely to be found, are predictable:
(i) Companies and the government spend extraordinary sums each
year on efforts at compliance and enforcement, largely through the
preparation of "contemporaneous documentation" 3 by taxpayers and
attempts at comprehensive examinations by the IRS involving some of the
Service's most experienced and skilled personnel.
12. Even some of the few apparent comparables that are found to exist often
prove flawed. For example, often, such comparables arise in transitional situations in
which, for example, an industry is entering a new market and operates temporarily
through unrelated distributors, which after several years are acquired by the
manufacturing company. Prices charged in such situations are unlikely to be
representative of those that would be charged among members of commonly
controlled groups. Similarly, one might find within a market independent distributors
of small-volume "niche market" products within an industry, whereas the large-
volume distributors will almost invariably be controlled by their manufacturers. See
Michael C.Durst & Robert E. Culbertson "Clearing Away the Sand: Retrospective
Methods and Prospoective Documentation in Transfer Pricing Today."(2003) at 47-
48.
13. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6.
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(ii) Despite the expense of compliance and enforcement, companies
and the IRS typically are dramatically far apart in their determinations of
arm's length pricing. Controversies routinely involve hundreds of millions of
dollars and are resolved at amounts that resemble neither the government's
nor the taxpayer's positions, thereby casting grave doubt on the conceptual
soundness of the underlying rules.14
(iii) The inability to predict whether their positions will be sustained
leaves companies and their investors with large areas of uncertainty in their
financial statements.
(iv) The absence of clear standards for compliance, coupled with the
ability under the arm's length standard to apportion income to low-tax
countries through legal arrangements governing the sitting of intangibles and
(more recently) the bearing of risk, make it impossible for Congress to
predict with reasonable accuracy the actual amount of federal revenue that
will be raised as a result of any particular corporate tax rate that Congress
believes it has enacted.'s
14. A 1992 study by the General Accounting Office concluded that less
than 30% of transfer pricing adjustments proposed by IRS examiners ultimately
were upheld in subsequent proceedings. GAO (1992). Similarly, in a recent
multibillion dollar case settled out of court, the parties agreed on payment of 3.4
billion in settlement of pending transfer pricing claims; this represents concession of
about 50% of the deficiency before the Tax Court, although since the settlement
covered years in addition to those then pending before the court, the extent of IRS
concession appears to have been larger. Overall, while results vary from case to case,
the IRS typically recovers at trial only a small proportion of transfer pricing
deficiencies that it has asserted. The lament by Judge Gerber in one case gives a
good idea of the atmosphere to be found in this field of law, despite attempts to
project an image of statistical science: "Once again, we are left stranded in a 'sea of
expertise' and must navigate our own way through a complex record to decide what
constitutes an appropriate arm's-length consideration." H Group Holding, Inc. v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1999-334. The supply of very large, disputed transfer pricing
adjustments does not seem likely to be exhausted soon. See Nutt (2007).
15. Revenue implications of a move from the current transfer pricing
system are explored below. In connection with the potential revenue implications of
the proposed transfer pricing reform, it is useful to consider the implications for
transfer pricing reform proposals of the recently increased accounting scrutiny of
companies' uncertain tax positions following the reforms of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and, especially, the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Interpretation 48 (FIN
48). The new accounting rules probably reduce companies' expectations of financial
statement benefit from taking what might be perceived as "aggressive" tax positions.
Therefore, some of the revenue gains that might otherwise be expected from the
reform of transfer pricing rules (and from some other possible tax reforms) might
occur even in the absence of the reform. The recent accounting changes therefore
complicate the task of estimate revenue effects from reforms such as that proposed in
this article.
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(v) The fact that neither taxpayers nor enforcement authorities
typically have clear standards for judging compliance means that issues
involving very large amounts - billions of dollars - of federal revenue are
resolved in examination, settled in Appeals, resolved in negotiations under
tax treaties with foreign governments, negotiated through advance pricing
agreements, or settled by attorneys out-of-court after examination. In most
cases, federal privacy laws require that this decision-making occur outside
the public eye. In the authors' experience, those involved in this process have
served their roles with both integrity and skill. Nevertheless, the resolution of
issues involving such large amounts of money, without the benefit of clearly
discernable decision-making standards and public scrutiny, is not healthy for
the tax system.
(vi) A related problem is that the uncertain results under current
transfer pricing law degrade the quality of tax practice on the parts of both
taxpayer and government representatives, regardless of the high standards of
practice that both sides seek to maintain. Both sides are tempted to state, as
"starting points" for what is expected to be extended negotiation, positions
that strain the edges of what most would consider reasonable. The resulting
atmosphere contributes to a lessening of the publicly perceived credibility of
both corporations and the government - a development that is seriously
damaging to what will always remain a largely mixed economic system.
(vii) The vulnerability of the current transfer pricing system to the
shifting of income based on intangibles ownership and risk-bearing makes
necessary numerous additional complexities in the international tax system.
If the current transfer pricing regime were replaced by a more formulary
approach such as that suggested below, Congress could eliminate from the
Code many or all of the "base company" provisions of subpart F, retaining
only those portions of subpart F dealing with passive investment income.
The recent financial accounting changes, however, mitigate the problems of
current transfer pricing rules only to a limited extent. Although the accounting
reforms might prevent some transactions in which difficult issues may have arisen,
or have altered the pricing that companies have chosen to adopt in some
circumstances, the reforms generally do not eliminate the uncertainty of current
transfer pricing rules but shift some of the burden of dealing with it to financial
auditors. Moreover, much of the portability of income to low- or zero-tax
jurisdictions under the current rules does not depend on positions that most would
view as "aggressive," but instead involve straightforward application of today's
transfer pricing principles. Further, even if some arguably aggressive transactions or
reporting positions are eliminated, current transfer pricing rules will continue to
impose administrative burdens and uncertainties even with respect to entirely routine
transactions with no hint of tax avoidance intent. Thus, while the new accounting
rules pose many benefits, including imposing some restraints on transactions
arguably involving "aggressive" transfer pricing planning, they leave substantial
need for reform of the transfer pricing tax rules themselves.
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Considerable complexity would, of course, be retained, but much would be
eliminated. Similarly, transfer pricing vulnerabilities probably constitute the
most pressing argument against adoption of a territorial tax system. 16
Reforming transfer pricing rules could tip the policy-making balance in favor
of adopting a territorial system, thereby permitting elimination of the grossly
complex foreign tax credit system except as it relates to U.S. taxpayers'
passive investment income (which would remain subject to the U.S. tax
jurisdiction and for which credit rules would need to be retained). 7 The
current transfer pricing system therefore can be seen as the tail that wags the
dog of much unnecessary tax complexity.
M. A PROPOSAL TO ADOPT A FORMULA-BASED PROFIT
SPLIT SYSTEM OF APPORTIONMENT
Our proposal would address most of the aforementioned flaws in the
current system of international corporate taxation. Under a formulary profit
split, tax liabilities would reflect the economic reality of globally integrated
businesses, and they would not vary among businesses based on their relative
abilities to shift the ownership of intangible property. Firms would have no
incentive to shift income across countries through legal and accounting
techniques, as tax liabilities would be based on total world income as well as
the share of a firm's sales that occur in each destination. Moreover, since
even the shifting of income involving legal and accounting techniques
typically involves moving real activities to low-tax countries, the tax
incentive to locate plant and equipment, as well as employment, in low-tax
countries would also be reduced.18
Eliminating companies' ability to shift income would raise large
amounts of federal revenue. In particular, if the proposal offered here were
implemented in a revenue neutral fashion, it would enable a substantial cut in
the corporate income tax rate. Such a reduction would mean that many
corporate actors benefit directly by a move to a formula-based system,
16. Edward D. Kleinbard "Throw Teritorial Taxation From the Train." Tax
Notes Today, Feb. 6, 2007..
17. Id.
18. Under typical principles of tax law a multinational must be able to show
tax examiners some "substance" in those countries in which they claim income.
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thereby suggesting that the proposal might have a realistic chance of
widespread political support.' 9
A. How Would a Formulary Profit Split Work?
The proposed approach will divide income from each business
"activity" of a multinational group among the countries in which that activity
is conducted. An "activity" will be defined as a group of functions related to
the conduct of a particular trade or business to which two or more related
parties contribute, determined at the largest level of aggregation of functions
performed that will permit reliable identification of such related parties'
respective contributions to the functions comprising an activity. That activity
is treated as a single taxpayer and its income is calculated by subtracting
worldwide expenses from worldwide income, based on a global accounting
system, without regard to legal distinctions among units. The resulting net
income is apportioned among taxing jurisdictions based on a formula that
takes into account various factors. Each jurisdiction then applies its tax rate
to the income apportioned to it by the formula and collects the amount of tax
resulting from this calculation.
Following the pattern of one of the transfer pricing methods
currently used by the United States and many other countries, the "residual
profit split" method,20 the proposed system would (1) first assign to each
country an estimated market return on the tax-deductible expenses incurred
by the multinational group in that country (this element of income is
typically called the "routine" income in current tax practice under the
residual profit split method), and (2) would then divide any additional
income (which, in current transfer pricing practice, typically is called the
"residual" income and is seen as deriving from a multinational group's
19. As both a political and economic matter, though, it should be
recognized that a movement to a more formulary system, while permitting a
lowering of corporate tax rates across-the-board, is unlikely to permit the lowering of
rates to such an extent as compensate those companies that today make heavy use of
deferral opportunities for the loss of those opportunities. Therefore, for those
companies, typically in "brick and mortar" industries, that have been unable to use
current opportunities to shift income, a revenue-neutral implementation of a
formulary approach would represent a significant tax cut, whereas those that have
been able to shirt substantial income under the "arm's length" system would
experience an effective increase in tax. To mitigate this effect, it might be feasible to
phase in the new system gradually, as described below; alternatively, it is sometimes
suggested that measures to eliminate the tax advantages of deferral might be
accompanied by a "one time" opportunity to repatriate deferred income on favorable
terms, as has been offered in the past under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.
20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6; OECD Guidelines, chapter 6.
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intangible property) among the countries based on the group's relative sales
in each country.
The particular formula used, with the "residual" apportioned
according to sales, would provide a substantial improvement of the formulas
typically used among the U.S. states. In the experience of the U.S. states,
income has been allocated to state jurisdictions using a variety of formulas.
Historically, many U.S. states have used the so-called "Massachusetts
formula" which employs equal weights on property, payroll and sales. For
example, under an equally-weighted formula apportionment system, tax
liability to the U.S. government would be based on the U.S. tax rate times the
fraction of worldwide profits that are attributed to the United States. This
fraction would be based on how much of worldwide economic activity (an
average of sales, assets, and payroll shares) occurs in the United States.
Observers have noted, however, that an FA system such as that used
by the states creates an implicit tax on the factors used in the formula, thus
discouraging assets and employment in high-tax locations. Some of these
concerns are also present here due to the reliance on expenses in calculating
the normal return. Still, we propose a simpler formula for assigning residual
profit, which would only consider the fraction of sales in each location. Sales
would be determined on a destination-basis, based on the location of the
customer rather than the location of production. We propose this destination-
basis sales formula for several reasons; alternative formulas are also
discussed in Appendix B.
The key advantage of a sales-based formula is that sales are far less
responsive to tax differences across markets than investment in plant, and
employment, as the customers themselves are far less mobile than firm assets
or employment. Even in a high-tax country, firms have an incentive to sell as
much as possible. In addition, if some countries adopt sales-based formulas
for allocating residual profits, other countries will have an incentive to adopt
sales based formulas as well in order to avoid losing payroll or assets to
countries in which these factors are not part of the formula.
The U.S. state experience reinforces the merits of this proposal. In
recent years, many U.S. states have shifted to a formula that double-weights
the sales factor. State incentives to move toward a sales-based formula are
well documented. For example, Edminston (2002) generates a model with
this prediction, and Omer and Shelley (2004) document this trend
empirically. Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) demonstrate that U.S. states that
lower the weight on the payroll factor experience increases in manufacturing
employment. According to Weiner (2005), 23 states double-weight sales as
of 2004, and seven others place an even larger weight on sales. Some states
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even use a sales-only formula (which was approved for Iowa by the Supreme
Court).21
In addition, a formula that relies relatively heavily on sales is likely
to be conducive to international coordination of apportionment systems.
Because of the widespread belief that imposing taxes on imports and
exempting exports boosts national competitiveness and reduces trade
deficits, if a large trading country such as the United States were to adopt an
apportionment that depends largely on sales, other countries are likely to
perceive it in their interests to follow suit. It would also be in these countries'
economic interest to avoid the implicit tax on assets and payroll that is
embedded in formula that relies excessively on those two factors.22 This
built-in incentive for sales-based formulas would minimize the likelihood of
over or under-taxation due to disparate formulas, an obstacle to adopting
formulary apportionment.
We should note that in spite of the factors that are likely to cause
countries unilaterally to move toward coordination with a "first mover" in
the implementation of a formulary system that weights sales heavily, it
would be ideal to have international cooperation and consensus regarding
both the adoption of a formulary approach and the choice of formula. We
will discuss below the problems that arise if only the U.S. were to adopt FA,
or if different countries use different formulas. Although we do not believe
that these problems justify delay in implementing the proposed approach
under U.S. law, and we believe that it will be in the self-interest of most
countries to follow the U.S. lead in this instance, the United States should
seek as high a level of international coordination as is practical. The United
States should not, however, state as a policy that it will implement a more
formulary system only if international consensus can be achieved. Such
consensus will never be forthcoming - especially from those low-tax
countries that profit from the current system - and waiting for such
consensus will mean that meaningful reform can never be accomplished.
B. Five Key Advantages to a Formula-Based Profit Split
The most important advantage of a formula-based profit split is
summarized above: (i) the "arm's length" system is based on a mistaken
view of the operation of multinational groups, so that the search for
21. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
22. In the last 50 years, over 100 countries have adopted the VAT, and
every single one of them (including all other members of the OECD) has adopted the
destination principle (i.e. imposing VAT on imports and rebating it on exports). The
spread of destination-based VATs around the world provides a good example of how
tax innovations can spread without a coordinating supra-national agency or "world
tax organization," simply on the basis of countries' perception of their self-interest.
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"comparables" that the arm's length system requires is incapable of
producing useful results; and (ii) the resulting inability of either taxpayers or
tax agencies to discern standards for enforcement means that enforcement is
impossible. In the resulting uncertainty, firms find many ways to use
accounting and legal techniques, particularly the licensing of intangibles, to
shift income to zero- or low-tax countries in which the multinational groups
perform little if any real economic activity.
Under the proposed system, tax liabilities are based on a
multinational group's global income, and the share that is taxed by a national
jurisdiction depends on the fraction of the group's observable economic
activity that occurs in a particular country. There is no need for massive
economic studies that try to "estimate" arm's length prices in the absence of
meaningful benchmarks. Thus, while a truly precise definition and
measurement of economic value is likely unattainable, the proposed system
provides a reasonable, comparatively administrable, and conceptually
satisfying compromise that suits the nature of the global economy.2 3
The second advantage associated with the proposal is that it
eliminates the tax incentive to shift income through legal and accounting
devices, such as licenses of patents and other intangible property, to
subsidiaries in zero- or low-tax countries. As such income shifting incentives
often entail the movement of employees and plants outside the United States
in order to give "substance" to the income shifting that is achieved on paper,
removing the incentive for shifting through licenses and the like will also
result in less tax-distorted decisions regarding the location of economic
activity. By eliminating the opportunity to shift income merely "on paper,"
and thus also reducing incentives to move jobs and plants overseas, the
proposed approach should eliminate the kinds of profit distortions that are so
clearly visible in Figure 2.24
By reducing the ability of "tax haven" countries to attract income
from other countries' tax bases, an approach like that proposed here should
help governments around the world set their tax policies more independently.
The wishes of voters in each government influence the ideal size of
government, required revenue needs, and the allocation of the tax burden
among subgroups within society. Under the proposed approach, governments
will be better able to choose their own corporate tax rates based on their
23. If a sales-based formula is adopted, both U.S. and foreign-based MNEs
would be able to locate their headquarters (which frequently produce positive
externalities, such as those that flow from R&D) in the United States without
substantially increasing their tax burdens.
24. A very similar pattern is apparent in other years. The BEA data are
discussed further in Appendix A.
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assessments of these sorts of policy goals, rather than the pressures of tax
competition for an increasingly mobile capital income tax base.
The third advantage associated with the proposal is the massive
increase in simplicity that this would enable for the international tax system.
If an approach such as that proposed here were adopted by our major trading
partners, simplification gains would be particularly large, but simplification
would still exist even if the approach was adopted unilaterally. To determine
U.S. tax liability, there would be no need to allocate income or expenses
among countries, resulting in far lighter compliance burden for firms.
Subpart F and the foreign tax credit, which are both hugely complicated and
a major source of transaction costs for US-based MNEs, can be greatly
simplified, since there will be greatly reduced opportunities for deferral of
business income under this system (which is essentially territorial and treats
U.S.- and foreign-based MNEs alike).
The likely administrative savings from abandoning the current
cumbersome transfer pricing regime are huge. The current regime consumes
a disproportionate share of both IRS and private sector resources. For
example, several recent Ernst and Young surveys of multinational firms have
concluded that "transfer pricing continues to be, and will remain, the most
important international tax issue facing MNEs." (Ernst and Young, 2006.)
Seventy percent of their respondents feel that transfer pricing documentation
has become more important in recent years, and 63% of respondents report
transfer pricing audit activity in the previous three years (Ernst and Young,
2005). A very recent Ernst & Young (2008) survey reports: "Among non-
U.S. owned organizations, by far the single most significant concern is with
transfer pricing and its documentation." For the government, audit costs are
several (three to seven) times higher for federal transfer pricing cases than
for state formula apportionment audits.25
Judicial opinions in transfer pricing cases run to hundreds of pages
each, and litigation can involve billions of dollars in proposed deficiencies,
such as in the recently settled Glaxo case ($9 billion in proposed deficiency,
settled for $3.4 billion) and the Aramco advantage cases (litigated and lost by
the IRS, which asserted deficiencies of over $9 billion). There is no
indication that the 1994 regulations under IRC section 482 have abated this
trend (Avi-Yonah, 2006).
The contemporaneous documentation rule adopted by Congress,
which requires taxpayers to develop documentation of their transfer pricing
methods at the time the transactions are undertaken rather than when they are
challenged on audit, as well as the complexity of the new SA methods (such
as the Comparable Profits Method, or CPM), have led the major accounting
25. See Dan R. Bucks and Michael Mazerov "The State Solution to the
Federal Government's International Transfer Pricing Problem." Nat'l Tax J. (1993),
46(3), 385-92.
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firms to develop huge databases and expertise in preparing transfer pricing
documentation for clients. This imposes large costs on major U.S.
multinational corporations (Durst and Culbertson, 2003). Meanwhile, small
and medium businesses, which cannot afford the major accounting firms, are
left to fend for themselves.
By contrast, the approach suggested here is relatively simple since it
requires only (1) defining activities (discussed below) and (2) establishing
the standard return on expenses and the destination of arm's-length sales of
goods or services. Once these two elements are established, the resulting
formula permits both taxpayers and the IRS to determine the correct tax
liability for each jurisdiction.
For small and medium sized businesses in particular, the proposed
approach will result in major cost savings as well as the potential for paying
less tax (since such businesses are rarely in a position to take on the IRS
under the current system). For major multinational firms, the proposed
approach also offers the prospect of avoiding the costs of contemporaneous
documentation, and while some firms may pay more tax than before, many
would welcome the opportunity of paying a single, low rate to each
jurisdiction in which they do business (especially if the adoption of this
proposal is coupled with a reduction in the corporate rate), instead of having
to cope with the complexities and costs of separate accounting. Of course,
some firms - i.e., those that have had the greatest opportunity to shift income
under the current system - will be hurt by the change in tax environment;
these issues are discussed below, in Section IV.
The fourth advantage associated with the adoption of a formulary
approach for the United States is that the new system would raise more
revenue, enable a substantial rate reduction, or both. Estimating how much
revenue such a change would raise is a difficult and imprecise task, and the
details of the implementing legislation and regulations would likely be
influential in determining the ultimate effects of the proposed change. Still,
previous studies and some preliminary calculations suggest that such a
change is likely to generate substantial additional U.S. government revenue.
Appendix A reviews several such calculations in more detail. For
example, one simple approach is to assume that multinational firms will
subsequently have U.S. income shares that are the same as their U.S. sales
shares; this would imply an increase in U.S. corporate tax revenues of 36%
in 2005. A second (and more complex) approach is to utilize regression
analysis to relate profitability to tax rates, and then estimate resulting
changes in revenues by removing such tax responses. This approach, taken
by a recent study, finds that tax avoidance activities reduce corporate income
earned in the United States by over $180 billion in 2004, resulting in
corporate tax revenues that are about 35% lower. Since our proposed
formulary profit split approach would eliminate tax avoidance incentives,
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one would expect it to raise revenues by a similar order of magnitude
(although our proposal's departure from a pure sales-based apportionment
will mean some differences in results).
A final approach is that taken by Shackelford and Slemrod (1998);
they use accounting data in financial reports for 46 U.S.-based multinational
corporations over the period 1989 to 1993 to estimate changes in revenue
under a three-factor FA system. They find that U.S. government revenues
from the corporate income tax would increase by 38%. This increase is not
dependent on any particular factor, and they calculate that a single factor
sales formula would increase revenues by 26%. Given the changes in the
international tax environment since the time period of their data, and in
particular the increasing discrepancy between the U.S. corporate tax rate and
those of other major countries, these estimates likely understate the potential
U.S. revenue gain from a proposal such as that offered here. Still, a recent
attempt to replicate the results of Shackelford and Slemrod using more recent
data found a smaller revenue effect; this surprising finding may be due to
increased discrepancies between book and tax income in recent years; see
Appendix A for more details.
Table I shows illustrative statistics on the operations of U.S.
multinational affiliates in 2005 for all countries where the Bureau of
Economic Analysis reports data and where affiliate operations are at least
one-half of 1% of world-wide totals in either sales or income. Column 1
shows the share of worldwide foreign affiliate sales that occur in each
country, column 2 shows the share of worldwide affiliate net income earned
in each country, column 3 shows the effective tax rate, and column 4 shows
the percentage by which the income share exceeds or falls short of the sales
share. Countries are shown in descending order of values for column 4, and it
is immediately apparent that those countries with income shares that vastly
exceed their sales shares tend to be very low-tax countries, and those with
sales shares that exceed their income shares are typically high-tax countries.
Thus, it appears quite likely that a sales-based formula apportionment system
would increase revenues in comparatively high-tax countries, decreasing
them in low-tax countries.
As one plausible conjecture, if revenues increase by 35% with
formula apportionment, one can also calculate the tax rate reduction that
would be possible with a revenue-neutral implementation of the proposal
suggested below. In that case, the implied new corporate tax rate would be
26%, nine percentage points lower than the current corporate tax rate of
35%. Of course, one could also pursue an intermediate policy that allowed a
smaller rate reduction and also increased revenues more modestly. Appendix
A provides more background on these calculations.
Therefore, adoption of FA can help address the four flaws in the
current system of U.S. taxation that were discussed in Section 11 of the paper.
There are also potential gains due to coordination with other taxes as well as
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coordination among countries. Consider first coordination with value added
taxes. Existing VATs around the world depend on defining the destination of
sales of goods and services. Determining destination for goods is relatively
easy because of customs enforcement. In fact, many jurisdictions use
harmonized rules for customs, VAT and income tax collection. Determining
destination for services is harder, but countries have developed significant
expertise in it under VAT. 2 6 If the United States adopts a sales-based
apportionment formula, it can learn from this experience even without
adopting its own VAT. If the U.S. subsequently adopts a VAT, the rules for
determining sales destination under FA can be coordinated with the VAT
rules. In addition, existing U.S. regulations already define destination and
origin of goods for purposes of trade regimes, tax-based export subsidies,
and under the base company rules of subpart F.
This proposal also introduces the possibility of gains from
coordination with other countries. The EU Commission is actively working
on defining a common tax base and apportioning it among member states by
formula. We can learn from this effort (which itself learned from the U.S.
state and Canadian province experiences).27 Also, if the United States and the
European Union both adopt formulary approaches, there is obvious potential
for coordinating their efforts through the OECD. It may in fact be possible,
given current discussions of FA within the EU, to reach agreement with the
EU (and possibly with other OECD members) on the adoption of a new
system before it is actually implemented.
Still, while an international agreement would be ideal, we do not,
again, believe that reaching such an agreement should be a necessary
prerequisite to the United States adopting a formulary-based profit split
unilaterally. Many significant advances in international taxation, such as the
foreign tax credit and CFC regimes, as well as more problematic
developments such as the current transfer pricing methods, resulted from
unilateral action by the United States, which was followed by most other
jurisdictions and by the OECD. The distortions and revenue losses of the
current system are too serious to permit delay until the perhaps-impossible
goal of international consensus can be achieved.
26. OECD, Report: The Application of Consumption Taxes to the Trade in
International Services and Intangibles, CTPA/CFA (OECD 2004); EU VAT
Directive 2006/112/EC (EU 2006), as revised in EU 2007; OECD, Applying
VAT/GST to Cross-Border Trade in Services and Intangibles, Emerging Concepts
for Defining Place of Taxation (OECD 2008).
27. See Joann Martens Weiner "Formulary Appointionment and Group
Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United States and Canada."
European Commission Taxation Working Paper no 8. (Mar. 2005).
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IV. ADDRESSING THE DOWNSIDES OF FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT:
A PRACTICAL STATUTORY APPROACH
This section of the paper will consider the concerns that typically are
raised with respect to adoption of a more formulary apportionment system,
and will describe how the statutory language that is proposed here would
address those concerns. The concerns fit into four broad categories. First,
some critics argue that FA is inherently arbitrary. Second, there are
implementation issues associated with the definition of activities and the
determination of the location of sales. Third, there are problems associated
with interactions between countries with incongruent corporate tax systems.
There is a potential for zero or double taxation. Accounting standards across
countries are not uniform, and tax treaties may need modification. Finally,
the proposed system is likely to affect some stakeholders adversely, as some
domestic industries and firms will find that their tax obligations will increase
under the new system.
A. Is Formulary Apportionment Arbitrary?
Some would consider basing the corporate income tax liability
largely on a routine return to expenses and the extent of sales in a particular
country to be arbitrary. Still, it is not clear that the current SA regime is less
arbitrary given the incentive to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Under
the current regime, it is quite possible that a MNE will not pay taxes either in
the location of production (because of tax competition and production tax
havens) or in the location of distribution (because it can avoid having a
permanent establishment or minimize the profits attributable to the
distribution function), while any tax due to its residence jurisdiction is
subject to deferral or exemption. Such a result is more arbitrary than
consistently assigning profits to the market jurisdiction, especially if most
countries adopt similar formulas.
It is true that any formula can produce arbitrary results in a given
industry. For example, the oil industry has long argued that it is unfair to tax
it based on payroll, assets or sales because most of its profits result from the
oil reserves themselves, which are not reflected in the formula (since they are
typically not assets of the company for any length of time). However, while
some industries will lose under the proposed formula, others (such as major
U.S. exporters) will win, and most taxpayers would gain from the increased
simplicity and transparency of the FA regime. If companies are willing to
pay one level of tax and are only concerned about double taxation, they
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should be willing to accept the FA option, which prevents double taxation
but also double non-taxation.2 8
B. Implementation
1. Statutory Proposal
The statute below (Appendix C) is modeled closely on the residual
profit split method of the current U.S. transfer pricing regulations and the
OECD Guidelines. It has obvious "formulary" elements, but it avoids the
problem of distorting international investment patterns by basing the
apportionment of "residual" income on the international division of sales
revenues, rather than "property" and "payroll." (Property and payroll figure
indirectly in the apportionment of "routine" rather than "residual" income
under the statute through their effects on a party's expenses). Most
importantly, the statute avoids the two elements that have caused the current
regulations and their predecessors to fail: namely (i) reliance on
"uncontrolled comparables" and (ii) "functional analysis" based on the
taxpayer's facts and circumstances. 29
A central challenge of implementing the proposed statute (or any
statute with formulary elements) will be to deal effectively with the need to
determine the geographic distribution of a party's sales revenue. The need to
distinguish sales for final use as opposed to storage or transshipment, and the
difficulties of determining locations for sales of raw materials and
intermediate goods, intangible property and certain services (e.g., financial
28. It can also be argued that "ignoring intangible property," which is the
source of most of the value added by MNEs, is arbitrary under both our formula and
the state formulas (that do not include intangibles in the property factor). But
intangibles do not have a real location, and their value inheres in the whole MNE,
which is why they cannot be adequately addressed under SA. Any formula that
"ignores" intangibles in fact assigns their value to the entire MNE (divided based on
the other factors used in the formula), and we believe this result more accurately
reflects the nature of intangibles.
29. The approach proposed below, which depends heavily on the
geographic locations of various activities, can be applied only to apportionment of
income among geographic areas, and cannot be used for apportionment of income
within a single jurisdiction - for example, between related companies that do not file
consolidated returns under a single country's rules, or between related taxable and
tax-exempt entities located in the same country. As indicated in the attached
proposed statute, it is anticipated that an "arm's length" approach will need to be
retained for domestic use, although that system could be greatly simplified if it is
used only for domestic apportionment purposes (e.g., by using safe harbors in lieu of
comparables searches when determining markups in pricing the provision services).
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services), will require toleration of some degree of reasonable estimation and
generally will require some restraint in enforcement. In addition, owing to
the wide range of situations in which sales can arise, regulations will need to
be detailed, and a rulings process will be needed to provide flexibility for
particularly difficult situations. The administrative challenges involved in
determining the geographic distribution of sales revenue should be relatively
limited compared to those posed by the virtually endless need for fact-
finding under current rules, but the challenges nevertheless should be
understood and foreseen. A reformed transfer pricing system should provide
many advantages, but it will not lead even remotely to perfection.
The proposed statute incorporates provisions that are designed to
address the following substantive and procedural issues: 30
(i) determining a reasonable "routine" rate of income without the
need to search for comparables and engage in functional
analyses;
(ii) determining where, geographically, "sales" occur and
"'expenses" are incurred and protecting those determinations
from artificial distortion;
(iii) defining the group of activities to which the new method is to be
applied;
(iv) coordinating the new statute with existing income tax treaties;
(v) coordinating the new statute with rules for apportioning interest
expense;
(vi) coordinating the new statute with rules governing withholding
taxes on interest, royalties and dividends;
(vii) providing simplified rules for small-business taxpayers; and
(viii) providing for regulatory and other guidance, including private
letter rulings to deal with difficulties in applying the various
definitions that will be required under a revised statute.
In addition to the text of the proposed statute, Appendix _ to this
article provides, both in footnotes and in the examples, explanatory language
30. Overall, as Internal Revenue Provisions go, the suggested statutory
language is relatively (although certainly not unprecedentedly) complicated, but it is
dramatically less complex than the regulations that have been issued and continue to
be issued under § 482.
31. With respect to this final point, an aspect of the proposed statute that
might prove controversial is that private letter rulings granted under the new system
(for example, rulings determining how "revenues" will be defined in a particular
instance) would be subject to the same degree of public disclosure as other private
rulings (i.e., with taxpayer identifying information removed), thus effectively
removing the special exceptions from disclosure that Congress has provided for
advance pricing agreements in §§ 6103(b)(2) and 6110(b)(1)(B) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
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that might be suitable for inclusion in congressional committee reports and in
regulations. A question in drafting any complex tax statute is the degree of
specificity that should be set forth in the statute as opposed to being reserved
for regulations. While the desire for flexibility in administration often favors
reserving large areas for regulation, the following statute includes a good
deal of detail in the statutory language itself. Legislative drafters might well
want to change this balance; in this article, however, we have retained
significant specificity in the statute largely in an attempt to illustrate the
nature of the issues that will need, one way or another, to be addressed in
detail.
2. Interactions Between Countries with Different Tax Systems
It would be ideal for most major countries to coordinate
implementation of FA and to come to a joint agreement on the definition of
the formula for apportioning global income. Given that the European Union
(EU) is already pursuing the possibility of FA within Europe, a natural forum
for reaching international consensus on these issues would be the OECD.
With international cooperation, the possibility of double or non-taxation
would be reduced and there would be less room for multinational firms to
respond strategically to variations in country formulas.
Even without formal cooperation, however, unilateral adoption by
the United States of a reformed system for taxing international income would
create a powerful incentive for other countries using separate accounting to
adopt similar new systems. In a world with both formulary and separate
accounting system countries, formulary countries will immediately appear as
tax havens from a separate accounting country perspective. For example, a
multinational firm operating in both separate accounting and formulary
countries would have an incentive to book all their income in formulary
countries, as the tax liability in such countries does not depend on the income
booked there, but rather the fraction of a firm's activities in that location.
Such responses would likely greatly reduce the tax revenues of remaining
separate accounting countries. Thus, separate accounting countries will have
a strong incentive to adopt formulary approaches, particularly if large
economies adopt formulary approaches.
Moreover, the experience of the U.S. states amending their formulas
to emphasize the sales factor, and the experience of over 100 countries
adopting the destination-based VAT, and a number of other experiences in
the development of international tax law, suggest that there is a significant
likelihood that if the U.S. were to adopt a sales-based formula, other
countries would be inclined to follow suit. The U.S. led the way in adopting
the foreign tax credit (1918), Subpart F (1962), and the current transfer
pricing regulations (1968 and 1994), all of which were followed by most of
2009] 519
HeinOnline  -- 9 Fla. Tax Rev. 519 2008-2010
Florida Tax Review
our major trading partners and recognized by the OECD. It is quite possible
that if the U.S. adopted the proposed formulary split, this would be another
innovation that is widely copied, with or without explicit coordination.
Still, if the United States adopts a formulary approach unilaterally
and other countries do not follow suit (or follow suit much later), or if
countries adopt different formulas, there is the potential for double or zero
taxation. This is, arguably, the largest obstacle to unilateral adoption of a
formulary system; but the significance of the obstacle should not be
overstated. Although situations of double taxation or double non-taxation
could arise, it is not clear that a formulary approach would produce more
double or non-taxation than the current regime. The notorious absence of
clear standards under the current separate accounting system means that
different countries routinely reach widely disparate divisions of income
under the same facts. It is hard to imagine that a reformed system, which at
least provides clear quantitative benchmarks, would lead to as many double
taxation, or double non-taxation, disputes as the current system already
produces.
For example, the IRS recently settled a major transfer pricing case
with the British firm Glaxo for $3.4 billion. This additional revenue resulted
from shifting to the U.S. profits that Glaxo claimed belonged in the UK.32 It
is far from clear that the UK tax authorities would accept the result of this
settlement: Under the US-UK tax treaty, they are not required to do so. (Art.
9 of the treaty only states that a country must make a "correlative
adjustment" when profits are shifted by the other treaty partner if it agrees
that the profit shift was justified.) The dispute resolution mechanism in most
of our tax treaties does not provide for binding arbitration and therefore does
not necessarily lead to a resolution. As Justice Brennan observed in the
Container case (approving California's application of worldwide FA to US-
based MNEs), it is not clear which method (FA or SA) produces more over-
or under-taxation, even when some countries use FA and the others use SA,
or when different formulas are used.
In summary, with respect to the potential problem of double
taxation, it must be remembered that the current system, which typically
provides only wide ranges of potential "answers" to any given transfer
pricing issue, often results in very divergent positions being taken by
different countries, even when both countries ostensibly are applying the
same "arm's length" principles. Therefore, as a starting point, it should not
be thought that a revised section 482 would move us from a system without
32. For news reports describing the Glaxo matter, see Glaxo Preparing to
Litigate Transfer Pricing "Heritage Product" Dispute in United Kingdom, Daily Tax
Report, Mar. 7, 2007, at 1-3; and GlaxoSmithKline to Pay $3.4 Billion To Settle
Largest Dispute in IRS History, Daily Tax Report, Sept. 12, 2006 at GG-1.
33. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
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substantial double taxation to a system with double taxation; in fact, it is not
at all clear whether adoption of a statute like that below would lead to more
or less danger of double taxation. Of course, to the extent other countries,
particularly those within the European Union, develop formulary systems of
their own, a formulary approach by the United States would fit well into an
international system for avoidance of double taxation.34
In order to evaluate the question of double taxation during the period
when a U.S. formulary system might be mixed with arm's length systems in
other countries, it should be recognized that those multinational groups that
have, to date, adopted tax-minimization structures involving transfer pricing
typically have sought to minimize their taxable incomes in all high-tax
countries in which they operate, not only the United States, and to shift
income into low- or zero-tax countries. As a result, a unilateral move by the
United States to a formulary system is not likely to increase disputes with
other high-tax countries; rather, it is likely to increase disagreements with
low-tax countries that have sought actively to attract income and business
from the United States. It is not clear that avoidance of these kinds of tax
disputes constitutes a valid reason to delay reform of the U.S. transfer pricing
rules.
It nevertheless needs to be recognized that a unilateral move to a
formula-based approach is likely to result in political controversy with the
low-tax countries, 35 and because the interests of those countries will coincide
with those of companies that seek to retain the subsidies implicit in the
current system, those governments may find themselves in political alliance
with multinational companies themselves. How to resolve the resulting
controversy is a question that will need to be resolved by Congress - but the
34. The support among many countries for the CCTB suggests that political
attitudes in some countries have changed substantially since the early 1990s when, as
described in Michael C. Durst and Robert E. Culbertson "Clearing Away the Sand:
Retrospective Methods and Prospetive Documentation in Transfer Pricing Today."
(2003) Tax Law Review, 57. 37-84 at 80-81, international officials generally
opposed actions that might lead to a more formulary transfer pricing system. Today,
dissatisfaction with current transfer pricing rules appears widely shared
internationally, as evidenced by government officials' expressions of concern with
"restructurings" around the world. The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs is now
devoting substantial attention to problems posed by "restructurings." See Committee
on Fiscal Affairs, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Discussion Draft on the Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructuring, Sep. 19,
2008.
35. The government of Ireland, for example, currently is opposing the
CCTB proposal within the European Union.
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controversy should be recognized as primarily political in nature. Overall, it
would not appear that concerns about "double taxation," significant though
they may be, should be sufficient to deter Congress from taking action that
could substantially improve the efficiency and apparent fairness of the U.S.
international tax system.
3. Defining the Tax Base
It would, of course, be desirable for a U.S. move to a formulary
system to be accompanied by international coordination of the tax base. A
common definition of the tax base (as opposed to harmonized tax rates,
which are unlikely as well as undesirable) is plausible to achieve because
MNEs already use uniform accounting for world-wide financial reporting
purposes. Thus, it is quite possible to use financial reporting as the starting
point for calculating the global profit of the MNE, to be allocated to
jurisdictions based on the FA formula. While there are still differences in
accounting among countries, those are diminishing due to the spread of
International Accounting Standards, which have been adopted in the EU and
Japan. Further, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission announced in
August 2008 that it would allow some large U.S. multinational firms to begin
using international accounting standards as early as next year, and eventually
require all American companies to do so. Alternatively, it may be possible to
let each MNE use its home country's accounting methods for calculating the
global tax base (as suggested by the EU Commission for inter-EU
purposes). Such changes would also have the advantage of more closely
aligning book income and tax income. This could act a damper on both the
underreporting of income for tax purposes as well as the overstatement of
income for the purpose of signaling profitability to financial markets.38
36. A resolution of this political issue might be aided through transitional
rules, for example rules permitting U.S. multinationals to receive foreign tax credits,
for a limited period of time (perhaps with a phase-out) for taxes paid by affiliates to
foreign governments, provided the taxes are imposed at statutory rates not exceeding
a specified maximum (such as 15%) that would be based on the practices of
particular low-tax countries.
37. See EU Commission, Company Taxation in the Internal Market, COM
(2001) 582 Final (2002), 13.1.
38. This is discussed in Mihir Desai "The Degradation of Reported
Corporate Profits." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4) 171-192 (Fall 2005),
where he recommends reconsideration of the dual-reporting system. Desai (2003)
reports an increasing divergence between book income and tax income, with more
than half of the divergence not explained by conventional differences between the
measures. For the United States in 1998, he estimates that this discrepancy amounts
to about 34% of tax income (just over $150 billion), and he attributes these trends to
increased tax sheltering activities.
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However, if coordination of the tax base with accounting-based
measures were unachievable or undesirable, the proposed formulary
approach could also be implemented unilaterally by the U.S. using its
definition of taxable income and applying it to the entire MNE. U.S.-based
MNEs already have to calculate the earnings and profits of CFCs for
purposes of Subpart F and the foreign tax credit, so the additional
information required for unilateral adoption would not be overly
burdensome. For non-U.S. based MNEs, the U.S. system could use financial
reporting to shareholders (already required by the SEC or by home country
regulators) as the base for calculating worldwide income. While this would
create a disparity between U.S. and non-U.S. based MNEs, the disparity
would probably be no more significant than it is under current transfer
pricing regimes around the world, which often must operate from measures
of income as determined under local accounting systems.
Concern is sometimes expressed that a transfer pricing system
depending on application of an apportionment formula to global income will
require the IRS to gain access to information on both U.S. and foreign
multinational groups' operations outside the United States. Current transfer
pricing law, however, already requires access to such information, both in
the application of the profit split method and in the course of examinations.
Indeed, current law requires both U.S. and foreign companies to retain and
provide on request to the IRS voluminous information on non-U.S.
operations. 39 There is no way to avoid offering national tax administrations
access to information on activities in other jurisdictions.
4. Interaction with Tax Treaties
Some have argued that tax treaties will need modification with
adoption of formulary apportionment. However, it is not clear that existing
U.S. tax treaties will have to be renegotiated, at least in the short term.
Transfer pricing is currently governed by Article 9 of the treaties,
which seems to assume the SA method because it addresses the commercial
or financial relations between associated enterprises. In addition, Article 7 of
the treaties provides generally for the application of SA principles in
apportioning income among branches of single corporations - a technically
complex topic not directly addressed in this article, although it raises issues
similar to those raised when dealing with apportionment among separate
affiliates.
There can be no question that historically, both Article 7 and Article
9 have been interpreted as incorporating "arm's length" concepts such as
resorting to supposed "comparables," and the other accoutrements of
39. IRC §§ 6038A and 6038C and regulations thereunder.
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attempted transfer pricing administration under the SA regime. There is no
reason, however, why the United States and its treaty partners could not
agree, under the "competent authority" process contained in each treaty and
discussed above, to interpret their treaties to accept the reformed
apportionment approach as the closest feasible, and administrable,
approximation to the "arm's length" results envisioned in Articles 9 and 7.
Except for low-tax, "tax haven" countries, one would expect many if not
most U.S. tax treaty partners eagerly to accept such an approach, since these
treaty partners face the same difficulties in enforcement and administration
of transfer pricing rules that the United States faces.
There may, to be sure, be some countries that will insist on retaining
the current SA-based analysis in their treaty dealings with the United States.
In such instances, case-by-case negotiation will be necessary in order to
avoid double taxation - but such negotiations are required to an unacceptably
large extent even under the current system, the vagueness of which leads to
numerous conflicts among tax jurisdictions over particular cases. The
attached proposed legislation includes provisions designed to ensure that
U.S. negotiators have authority to interpret U.S. tax treaties as authorizing
the proposed reformed transfer pricing methodology in double taxation
negotiations with treaty partners.4 0
One can expect low-tax countries, as well as those multinational
businesses that are favored under the current transfer pricing regime, to
assert vigorously that the new regime is in violation of income tax treaties.
Such assertions will, however, reflect disagreement with the reformed system
on policy grounds, rather than reflecting any serious impediment in the tax
treaty system to the adoption of the new system. Political opposition to the
reform from low-tax countries and from businesses that will pay relatively
larger shares of the corporate tax burden must be respected and dealt with -
but such political opposition should be recognized for what it is.
C. Negative Effects on Some Corporate Stakeholders
Analysts have noted that adoption of FA would disproportionately
affect some industries and firms negatively. For example, Shackelford and
Slemrod (1998) find that FA raises tax liabilities for some industries and
firms, lowering burdens for others. They estimate that the oil and gas
industry would see an increase in tax liabilities of 81% under FA, compared
with 29% for all other firms in their study. (The mean oil and gas company
40. This language, by manifesting congressional intent that the reformed
system should be treated as acceptable under existing U.S. income tax treaties,
should preclude successful invocation of treaties in judicial challenges to application
of the new system. See Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC v. United States, 512 F.3d
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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in their study reports 68% of assets in the United States, 70% of sales in the
United States, and 78% of total compensation paid to U.S. employees, but
such companies book 42% of pretax earnings in the United States.) The
authors also estimate that some firms will experience a tax decrease,
including Boeing and Procter and Gamble. The update of Clausing and
Lahav (2008) suggests a similar pattern, with tax increases for oil companies
(e.g.) and tax decreases for Boeing, Procter and Gamble, and Intel.
Under our proposal, firms with a disproportionate amount of U.S.
sales relative to U.S. income would see tax increases under FA, while those
with relatively low U.S. sales compared to U.S. income (e.g., large
exporters) would see tax decreases. In addition, firms that derive their
income largely from high-value technological intangibles would likely be
adversely affected by adoption of FA, as these firms have the greatest
opportunities for lowering their tax burdens under the current system.
Indeed, Clausing and Lahav (2008) predict tax increases for some intangible-
intensive firms like Pfizer and Johnson Controls, but also tax decreases for
others such as Walt Disney and 3M.
Also, negative impacts may be muted by several considerations.
First, firms will benefit from reductions in complexity and compliance
burdens. Small and medium size businesses should be particularly
appreciative of such benefits. Second, accompanying the adoption of a more
formulary system with a reduction in the corporate income tax rate would
increase the number of firms benefiting from the adoption. A rate reduction
would also appeal to those concerned that the U.S. is losing competitiveness
because of the current rate disparity.
V. CONCLUSION
Our proposal for the adoption of a formula-based profit split for the
U.S. taxation of corporate income responds to the reality of an increasingly
global world. Multinational firms have internationally integrated operations,
and they are responsive to the incentives created by discrepancies among
national tax policies. A separate accounting system generates an artificial
need to assign income and expenses by location, and this creates ample
opportunities for tax avoidance.
The proposed system would greatly reduce the complexities
associated with sourcing income and expenses across locations, and it would
eliminate the incentive to use legal and accounting techniques to shift income
to more lightly-taxed locations. Further, because these legal and accounting
techniques often involve moving jobs and plant overseas to support the
"substance" of the techniques, eliminating the techniques would reduce tax-
motivated shifts of employment and investment outside the United States.
By eliminating opportunities to shift income from the United States,
the proposed approach would increase U.S corporate tax revenues would
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likely increase significantly. Alternatively, the proposal could be
implemented in a revenue neutral fashion, allowing for a dramatic reduction
in the corporate tax rate.
Those who benefit from the current system are certain to proclaim,
loudly, what will be described as terrible difficulties of moving to a reformed
system, but on close analysis the obstacles to effective reform appear
surmountable. Perhaps the most significant objection to adoption of a
reformed system is that such a step would entail conflict with some U.S. tax
treaty partners. In all likelihood, however, such conflict would involve
almost entirely those treaty partners that have chosen to adopt unusually low
corporate income tax rates in an effort to attract investment from the United
States and other non-haven countries. Most other countries, which face
difficulties in administering their own transfer pricing systems similar to the
difficulties faced by the United States, are likely to cooperate in
implementing and refining the new system. Questions of international comity
do not preclude serious reform of the transfer pricing system; if the United
States has the political will for such reform, it can feasibly be accomplished.
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Figure 1, Panel A: Statutory Corporate Tax Rates, OECD Countries,
1979-200441
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41. Statutory tax rate data are from PricewaterhouseCoopers, Corporate
Taxes: Worldwide Summaries. Effective tax rate data are calculated as foreign
income taxes paid relative to net (pre-tax) income for U.S. affiliates operating in a
particular country. These data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA);
they are discussed further in Appendix A.
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Panel B: Average Effective Tax Rates, OECD Countries, 1982-2004
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Figure 2: Where Were the Profits in 2005?
(profits as a percentage of the worldwide total)
Country Effective Tax Rate
Netherlands 5.1%
Luxembourg 0.9%
United Kingdom 28.9%
Bermuda 0.9%
Ireland 5.9%
Switzerland 3.5%
Canada 21.4%
Singapore 3.2%
U.K. Islands 1.9%
Belgium 8.7%
Notes: In 2005, majority-owned affiliates of U.S. multinational firms earned
$336 billion of net income. This figure shows percentages of the worldwide
(non-U.S.) total net income occurring in each of the top-10 income countries.
Thus, each percentage point translates into approximately $3.4 billion of net
income. Effective tax rates are calculated as foreign income taxes paid
relative to net (pre-tax) income. Data are from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) web page; 2005 is the most recent year with revised data
N:~t* .?
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available. The Bureau of Economic Analysis conducts annual surveys of
Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and Their Foreign Affiliates. These
data are discussed in more detail in Appendix A.
Figure 3: Where Were the Jobs in 2005?
(employment as a percentage of the worldwide total)
Country Effective Tax Rate
United Kingdom
Canada
Mexico
Germany
France
China
Brazil
Australia
Japan
Italy
28.9%
21.4%
21.8%
26.2%
21.3%
14.8%
18.1%
12.1%
34.7%
24.9%
Notes: In 2005, majority-owned affiliates of U.S. multinational firms
employed 9.1 million employees. This figure shows percentages of the
worldwide (non-U.S.) total employment occurring in each of the top-10
countries. Thus, each percentage point translates into approximately 91,000
jobs. Effective tax rates are calculated as foreign income taxes paid relative
4- ~ ~ ' ~+
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to net (pre-tax) income. Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) web page; 2005 is the most recent year with revised data available.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis conducts annual surveys of Operations of
US. Parent Companies and Their Foreign Affiliates. These data are
discussed in more detail in Appendix A.
Figure 4: Central Government Corporate Tax Revenues Relative to
GDP OECD Countries, 1982 to 2005
4
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Note: Data are from the OECD revenue statistics.
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Table 1: U.S. Multinational Firm Operations in 2005
(for those countries with the largest U.S. affiliate operations)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Excess Income
Share of Effective Share
Share of Sales Income Tax Rate (v. Sales)
Luxembourg
U.K. Islands
Bermuda
Austria
Netherlands
Denmark
Indonesia
Ireland
Switzerland
Venezuela
Belgium
Norway
Australia
Singapore
Hong Kong
China
Argentina
United
Kingdom
Spain
Canada
Malaysia
Japan
India
Korea,
Republic of
Thailand
Mexico
Poland
Italy
South Africa
Taiwan
France
Sweden
Germany
Brazil
0.4%
0.6%
1.4%
0.5%
4.4%
0.4%
0.4%
4.3%
4.3%
0.4%
2.3%
0.9%
2.5%
4.4%
2.0%
2.0%
0.6%
13.6%
2.0%
12.4%
1.1%
4.7%
0.5%
1.0%
0.9%
3.5%
0.6%
2.8%
0.5%
0.9%
4.9%
1.4%
7.3%
2.5%
10.5%
3.2%
7.2%
1.5%
13.0%
0.7%
0.6%
7.0%
6.7%
0.6%
2.8%
0.8%
2.0%
3.3%
1.3%
1.3%
0.4%
7.7%
1.1%
6.6%
0.6%
2.1%
0.2%
0.4%
0.4%
1.4%
0.2%
1.1%
0.2%
0.3%
1.6%
0.4%
1.8%
0.5%
1%
2%
1%
2%
5%
18%
35%
6%
3%
18%
9%
52%
12%
3%
11%
15%
20%
29%
17%
21%
18%
35%
22%
22%
30%
22%
14%
25%
51%
18%
21%
16%
26%
18%
2688%
428%
408%
202%
194%
67%
62%
62%
57%
51%
21%
-1%
-19%
-25%
-34%
-36%
-38%
-44%
-47%
-47%
-49%
-56%
-57%
-57%
-58%
-60%
-62%
-63%
-63%
-66%
-68%
-70%
-75%
-80%
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Countries are selected for inclusion in this table if either their sales share or
their income share exceeds one half of 1% of worldwide totals. Data are
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) web page; 2005 is the most
recent year with revised data available. The Bureau of Economic Analysis
conducts annual surveys of Operations of US. Parent Companies and Their
Foreign Affiliates. These data are discussed in more detail in Appendix A.
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Appendix A: Estimates of Revenue Gain Due to Formula
Apportionment
This appendix considers methods of estimating the revenue gain to
the United States government due to formula apportionment. All of these
methods rely on multiple assumptions and simplifications. The data are
imperfect and incomplete. Further, there are multiple margins under which
this change would affect multinational firm behavior both in the United
States and abroad, and there is substantial uncertainty regarding the net
influence of these responses on government revenues. Finally, the actual
legislation and accompanying regulations implementing FA would matter a
great deal in terms of ultimate effects on revenue.
Therefore, all of these estimates should be treated with a great deal
of caution, as a mere starting point for thinking about this question. That
said, estimates below paint a broadly consistent picture of large U.S.
government revenue gains with the adoption of formula apportionment.
1. The simplest estimate of the revenue gain relies on inferences from
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data regarding the
operations of U.S. multinational firms. According to 2005 data from
the BEA, U.S. multinational firms earn 52.4% of their worldwide net
income in the United States. However, 67.2% of worldwide sales for
these firms occurs in the United States. If the United States tax base
were 67.2% of worldwide income, it would increase by $285 billion.
With the increment taxed at the marginal tax rate of 35%, that would
generate $99 billion in additional revenue. Since revenues from the
corporate income tax in 2005 were $278 billion, that represents an
increase of 36%. The following Table shows the results of the same
calculations for the four most recent years with available data; 2002,
however, was likely an usual year, as net income in the United States
was abnormally low in comparison with other years.
2002 2003 2004 2005
Fraction of World Sales 71.6% 69.6% 68.1% 67.2%
in United States
Fraction of World Income 8.2% 56.7% 51.5% 52.4%
in United States
Implied New Revenue $79 b $52 b $82 b $99 b
Implied New Tax Revenue 54% 40% 44% 36%
as Share of Same Year's
Federal Corporate Tax Receipts
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If one assumes instead that the increment were taxed at the
average tax rate that was paid on corporate profits, then this increase
would be smaller. Yet in other ways, this estimate represents an
underestimate of the revenue gain since it includes only U.S.
multinational firms. Foreign-owned multinational firms with
affiliates in the United States would also face changes in their tax
treatment that will increase revenues as long as the fraction of their
worldwide sales in the United States exceeds the fraction of their
worldwide income booked in the United States. While this is not
possible to ascertain given the absence of BEA data on foreign
parent firms, profits do appear to be disproportionately low for these
firms relative to their sales in the United States. For example, in
2005, net income of U.S. parent multinational firms is 8.5% of their
U.S. sales, while net income for U.S. affiliates of foreign parent
firms is 3.2% of their U.S. sales.
A final issue concerning these calculations is the possibility
of double-counting in the BEA net income figures. These figures
include "income from equity investments", some of which may be
counted more than once if there are tiers of holdings within the same
country. Unfortunately, from existing BEA data, it is impossible to
tell exactly how large this problem is, or how much this problem is
correlated with the tax rate of the country in question.42 Using an
alternative data series from the BEA on direct investment earnings,
one can exclude all income from equity investments, but this too is
conceptually inappropriate. Still, I performed calculations that
employed this series nonetheless. To make the data comparable to
net income, I adjusted for the fact that direct investment earnings
were pro-rated to reflect the ownership stake of the U.S. parent,
assuming an average ownership stake of 68.6% for all firms. (This
was the average ownership stake in 2003.) One finds a very similar
fraction of worldwide income abroad, roughly 57% in both 2003 and
2004. Estimates of revenue gain from FA are about a third smaller,
due to some combination of a narrower definition of income as well
as the elimination of any double-counting.
2. Clausing (2008) undertakes estimates of the revenue lost to the
United States due to income shifting by U.S. multinational firms.
These are based on regressions that consider how profit rates (profit
to sales ratios) depend on affiliate country tax rates. For the time
42. Using German data, Weichenrieder (2006) finds no relationship
between the tax rates of host countries and more complicated ownership chains.
However, other tax factors are important, including whether the investing country
has a credit or exemption tax system.
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period 1993 to 2004, the regression results indicate that a tax rate
one percentage point higher (relative to the United States) is
associated with an affiliate profit rate about .8 percentage points
lower. This result is used, together with information regarding profits
and sales for each country and year, to calculate how profits would
be different absent tax influences, and thus how revenue would be
different in the United States absent income shifting.
By 2004, it is estimated that tax-motivated income shifting
shifts over $180 billion in corporate income out of the United States,
resulting in 35% lower corporate tax revenues; for the recent period
2001-2004, revenues are estimated to be 29% lower due to income-
shifting. Some estimates are lower or higher; there are multiple
assumptions that are embedded in the analysis that could cause the
results to be underestimates or overestimates.
For example, results depend on the specification of the tax
parameter, the econometric specification employed, assumptions
regarding the residual U.S. taxation of foreign income, the nature of
foreign multinational firm behavior, and assumptions regarding the
share of excess foreign income earned in low-tax countries that
should be attributable to the United States. Thus, the precise estimate
should be viewed with caution. Still, the nature of the main findings
is robust: the sign and statistical significance of the tax coefficients
are always as expected, and the consequences of tax avoidance grow
dramatically over the previous decade.
3. Other studies have generated estimates of a similar magnitude. The
most thorough estimate is Shackleford and Slemrod (1998); they use
accounting data in financial reports for 46 large U.S. based
multinational corporations over the period 1989 to 1993 to estimate
changes in revenue under a FA system.
Their estimates are based on firm financial statements and
the related income tax footnotes. Three certified public accountants
interpreted each detailed disclosure. Both domestic and foreign
taxable income were estimated as the sum of the current relevant tax
provisions and credits divided by the relevant statutory tax rate;
worldwide income is then the sum of domestic and foreign income.
The U.S. tax liability under formula apportionment is then calculated
as the product of worldwide taxable income, the formula for the
fraction of income allocated to the United States, and the U.S. tax
rate.
The authors find that FA raises tax liabilities for some
industries and firms, lowering burdens for others. They estimate that
the oil and gas industry would see an increase in tax liabilities of
81% under FA, compared with 29% for all other firms in their study.
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They also estimate that some firms will experience a tax decrease,
including Boeing, Procter and Gamble, and Dow Chemical.
Overall, Shackleford and Slemrod (1998) find that revenues
would increase by 38% under a three-factor FA system. This
increase is not dependent on any particular factor, and they calculate
that a single factor sales formula would increase revenues by 26%.
Given the changes in the international tax environment since the
time period of their data, and in particular the increasing discrepancy
between U.S. corporate tax rates and those of other major countries,
these estimates likely understate the current U.S. revenue gain with
FA adoption.
Still, Clausing and Lahav (2008) have work in progress that
attempts to replicate the study of Shackelford and Slemrod, using
nearly identical methods and data from the period 2005-2007. The
sample is the fifty largest U.S. based multinational firms that have
adequate reporting data. They find a smaller increase in revenue, of
22% in 2007 and 13% for the three year period. Given the change in
the tax environment since 1989-1993, this is a surprising finding.
While more work is needed to clarify this result, it may stem from
the use of financial reports, rather than tax data. While Shackelford
and Slemrod also use financial reporting data, Desai (2003, 2005)
and others have noted increased discrepancies between book and tax
income over this time period.
Any of these estimates can be used to generate an estimate of what
corporate tax rate would be associated with a revenue neutral implementation
of formula apportionment. Taking as one baseline that tax revenues would
increase by 35% with formula apportionment, this implies that the corporate
tax rate could be lowered by 9 percentage points, to 26%. Of course, one
could also pursue an intermediate policy that lowered the corporate tax rate
less but that also modestly increased tax revenue.
Note that all of the estimates discussed above are based on book
income figures, not tax income. Numbers (1) and (2) utilize data from the
BEA surveys on multinational firms; number (3) uses data from firm
financial statements. It would be preferable to utilize data on tax income,
which is also presumably more responsive to tax incentives; however, this is
not possible absent access to Treasury data. Also note that none of these
estimates address methods that firms utilize to lower their taxable income
overall; the focus is instead on the sourcing of income.
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Appendix B: Other Formula Choices
Section III of the paper explains the merits of employing a sales-
based formula rather than the traditional "Massachusetts formula" which is
an equal-weighted average of sales, payroll, and asset shares. A sales based
formula has several advantages. First, firms have little ability to undertake
tax avoidance strategies with a destination-based sales formula, since firms
have no control over where customers are located. 4 3 Second, use of a sales-
based formula lessens any implicit tax on payroll and assets, which can
distort multinational firms' investment and employment decisions. Third,
U.S. states have demonstrated a tendency to increase the sales weight over
time, so adopting a sales based formula at the outset may encourage
countries to adopt more uniform formulas.
Still, multiple factor formulas have some advantages. First, while the
incidence of the corporate tax is a complex matter, beyond the scope of this
paper, one advantage of the equal-weighted formula is that the incidence of
the tax may be more desirable. For example, some argue that the asset
portion of the formula is particularly compatible with the desire to have the
corporate tax borne by capital. Second, some argue that a three-factor
formula more adequately captures the supply side of the process that
generates profit. Still, as was recognized as far back as Marshall (1890),
value has its roots in both supply and demand factors, and trying to separate
them is as futile as trying to determine which blade of the scissors cuts.
Third, to the extent that firms are able to manipulate the destination of their
sales (a problem that we think can be addressed to a large extent by careful
statutory drafting; see text), a multiple factor formula would make that type
of avoidance more difficult. Finally, to the extent that some countries view a
sales-based formula as not suited to their interests, a formula with several
factors could be viewed as a useful compromise.
In addition to a sales-based formula and an equally-weighted
formula, some have suggested a formula with a double weight on sales. For
example, Eichner and Runkel (2006) argue that such a formula would reduce
the harmful effects of tax competition, as the fiscal externalities of corporate
income taxation would be minimized.
Sorensen (2004) and Agundez-Garcia (2006) have discussed the
possibility of using industry or macro-based weights in these formulas. Thus,
a firm's tax liability in a particular country would not depend on its own
share of worldwide activity in the country, but rather on the industry-wide
average of these shares. If a firm is small relative to the industry, then its
own decisions have little effect on where its tax liability is assigned.
However, this method has the downside of separating a firm's activities from
43. Of course this assumes that the definition of activity is sufficient to
prevent manipulation of the destination of sales. This issue is discussed in the paper.
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the jurisdictions in which it incurs taxation, which would likely prove too
arbitrary. In the extreme, if macro-weights were used, a firm's tax liability in
a given country would depend on, e.g., the size of that country in the world
economy. So if the United States were one quarter of the world economy,
any firm with nexus in the United States would have a U.S. tax base equal to
one-quarter of their worldwide profits, even if the particular firm did 1% (or
99%) of its activity in the United States. This is unduly arbitrary.
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Appendix C: Suggested Statutory Language
Section 482. Allocation ofIncome and Deductions Among Taxpayers.
(a) In General - In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or
businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the
United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or
allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among
such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such
distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations,
trades, or businesses.4
(b) Income of Related Parties Resident for Income Tax Purposes in Different
Countries -
(1) In General - Except as otherwise provided in this section or in
regulations, if any party participates in an activity with one or more
related parties, and if such party and such related parties are resident
for income tax purposes in more than one country, the income of
such party from such activity, for purposes of subsection (a), shall
not be treated as resulting in evasion of taxes and shall be treated as
clearly reflecting such income, provided that the net operating
income or loss of all related parties participating in such activity is,
taking into account all payments and other transactions among such
related parties, divided among such related parties so that each earns
the sum of -
(A) an amount of operating income equal to a markup of
7.5% (or such other markup as the Secretary may prescribe
44. The proposed revision eliminates what is now the second sentence of §
482, commonly called the "commensurate with income" or "superroyalty" rule:
In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the
meaning of 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or
license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the
intangible.
Under the proposed revision, the concern that gave rise to enactment of this rule -
namely, that taxpayers would be able to assign the income from high-value
intangibles to countries in which disproportionately little activity occurs - generally
should not arise. If the propose revision is enacted, corresponding changes should
be made to § 367(d), which incorporates a similar rule.
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by regulation as described in subsection (d))4 5 on such
related party's expenses of such activity paid or incurred
with respect to persons other than related parties; and
(B) a proportionate share of any income from such activity
remaining after application of subparagraph (A), equal to
such party's proportionate share of the revenues of all
related parties that are derived from persons other than
related parties from such activity.
(2) Exception if Net Operating Income is Below Specified Threshold
or in Case of Operating Loss From Activity - If the combined
income of all related parties from an activity described in paragraph
(1) is greater than zero but is insufficient to provide all of such
related parties with the level of operating income described in
subparagraph (1)(A), or if the activity gives rises to a net operating
loss, the income of any such related party will satisfy the
requirement of paragraph (1) if the total operating income or the
operating loss, as the case may be, of such related parties is shared
among such related parties in proportion to their respective expenses
of such activity.
(3) Accounting Methods - Except as otherwise provided in this
section or in regulations, a party's revenue, expenses, operating
income and operating loss, if any, shall be determined according to
the accounting methods by which such party ordinarily keeps its
books and records.
(4) Rules Applicable to Related Parties Resident for Income Tax
Purposes in Different Countries Except as otherwise provided in this
section or in regulations, for purposes of this subsection -
(A) revenues from the provision of services shall be treated
as earned by the related party that is resident for income tax
45. The markup of 7.5% is prescribed based on the authors' observation
that tax practitioners in both private and government practice often consider such a
markup to be within reasonable ranges for many kinds of activities, and it is slightly
above the 7% markup set forth as the dividing line between "low margin" and other
services in recently promulgated regulations. Temp. Reg. § 1.482-9T(b)(4)(ii). It is
anticipated that the Treasury will by regulation prescribe different markups for
geographic locations, or particular industries, in which a markup of 7.5% does not
constitute a reasonable estimate of a "routine" level of return based on prevailing
market conditions.
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purposes of the country in which the services are
performed; 46
(B) except as otherwise provided in subparagraph 4(c),
revenues from the provision of tangible and intangible
property shall be treated as earned by the related party that is
resident for income tax purposes in the country in which the
tangible property is consumed or placed in service for its
intended use, and in which the intangible property is
used;4 8
(C) revenues from the provision of tangible property that is
to be incorporated into other tangible property, or otherwise
transformed substantially, by manufacturing or other
processes prior to sale to the user or consumer of such
tangible property, and revenues from the provision of
intangible property that is to be used in the manufacturing of
products, shall be treated as earned as follows:
(i) if the taxpayer establishes to the satisfaction of
the Secretary that the income from such
46. It is anticipated that regulations will provide for different treatment with
respect to advertising services. Regulations may, for example, provide that revenues
from advertising in print media be apportioned based on the taxpayer's best
reasonably available estimates of circulation, from advertising in electronic media
based on the taxpayer's best reasonably available estimate of the distribution of
viewers or listeners, or from internet advertising based on the taxpayer's best
reasonably available estimate of the distribution of website visits.
47. Regulations should specify that taxpayers will be permitted to base
determinations of where tangible property is consumed or placed in service for its
intended use on reasonable and good faith inferences, including statistical inferences,
based on information that is available to taxpayers in the ordinary course of business,
such as shipping records, customs filings, market surveys and other regulatory
filings (e.g., those dealing with food and drug laws or labeling requirements). The
IRS should challenge such determinations only if the taxpayer appears not to have
exercised reasonable care and due diligence in making estimates, or if inaccuracies
in a taxpayer's determinations might materially affect the taxpayer's income that is
subject to U.S. taxation.
48. For example, if a U.S. corporation licenses a patent to an affiliate in
Ireland, the Irish affiliate sublicenses the patent to an unrelated party in Germany for
use in the manufacture of products in Germany, the resulting royalty revenue will be
treated as earned in Germany if the U.S. corporation has an affiliate in Germany, or
(see proposed § 482(b)(4)(1)), if the U.S. corporation has no affiliate in Germany, the
resulting royalty income will be apportioned among the members of the group
according to their relative levels of expenses.
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manufacturing or other processes is subject to an
effective rate of income tax imposed by a foreign
country greater than 90% of the maximum rate of
tax specified in section 11, such revenues shall be
treated as earned in such foreign country;
(ii) if the taxpayer cannot establish that the income
from such manufacturing or other processes is
subject to an effective rate of taxation described in
subparagraph (C)(i), but if the taxpayer can establish
to the satisfaction of the Secretary, with reasonably
certainty, the countries in which such tangible
property, following incorporation into other property
or other transformation, or the property that is
manufactured using such intangible property, is used
or placed in service for its intended use, such
revenues shall be treated as earned in such countries;
and
(iii) if the taxpayer cannot establish the conditions
described in subparagraphs (C)(i) or (C)(ii), such
revenues shall be treated as earned in the United
States.
(D) revenues from the provision of banking, insurance,
brokerage, or other financial services, and revenues of a kind
described in section 954(c) that are attributable to particular
activities, shall be treated as earned by related parties in
proportion to their expenses of such activities as determined
pursuant to this subsection;50
(E) revenues from the provision of transportation described
in section 863(c), space and ocean activities described in
section 863(d), and international communications described
in section 863(e) shall, respectively, be treated as derived by
49. See supra note 57.
50. It is anticipated that regulations will provide that revenues for the
provision of banking, insurance, brokerage, or other financial services will be treated
as earned by the related party that is resident for income tax purposes in the country
in which such revenues can be identified, with reasonable certainty in view of the
records and other information available to the taxpayer, with services provided to
individuals resident, property located, or active business activities conducted within
that country.
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the related parties in a manner consistent with the principles
employed by those provisions and the regulations thereunder
in determining the sources of such income;
(F) expenses incurred for the provision of services shall be
treated as incurred by the related party that is resident for
income tax purposes in the country where the services are
performed;
(G) expenses related to tangible property, including but not
limited to expenses for depreciation and maintenance, shall
be treated as incurred by the related party that is resident for
income tax purposes in the country where the property is
located;
(H) expenses not otherwise described in this paragraph shall
be treated as incurred by the related party that is resident for
income tax purposes in the country where the benefit of such
expenses is derived;5'
(I) revenues or expenses that, under subparagraphs (A)
through (H), are treated as earned or incurred in a country in
which no related party participating in the activity is resident
for income tax purposes shall be treated as earned or
incurred, as the case may be, by all such related parties in
proportion to their respective expenses (determined prior to
the application of this subparagraph) that are related to the
activity; and
(J) if a related party incurs expenditures that benefit more
than one activity described in paragraph (1), such
expenditures shall be apportioned among such activities
51. Regulations should provide that the benefit of royalties paid with
respect to intangible property shall be treated as enjoyed in the jurisdiction in which
property is manufactured or services are performed using such intangible property.
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according to the relative benefits provided by such
expenditures.
(5) Exception for Activities Involving Only the Provision of Services
by a Related Party. If, with respect to an activity described in
paragraph (1), the only assistance or contribution provided by a
related party to other related parties consists of the performance of
personal services by employees or other persons (including the
procurement of tangible or intangible property from unrelated
persons for the benefit of a related party), then, at the election of the
taxpayer, the rules for allocation and apportionment of paragraphs
(1) through (5) shall not apply, and the income of any such related
party from such activity, for purposes of subsection (a), shall not be
treated as resulting in evasion of taxes and shall be treated as clearly
reflecting such income, provided that such related party earns a
markup on the expenses of performing such services equal to the
markup described in subparagraph (b)(1)(A) (or such other markup
as may be provided in regulations).
(6) Rule Related to the Use of Trademarks, Trade Names, and
Similar Marketing Intangibles. Except as otherwise provided in
regulations, the use by a party in one country of a trademark, trade
name, or similar marketing intangible that has previously been used
by a related party in another country shall not in itself constitute
participation by the related parties in an activity for purposes of this
subsection, unless one such related party has incurred or reimbursed
expenditures involving the advertisement or marketing of such
trademark, trade name, or similar marketing intangible, and such
advertising or marketing has, under standards prescribed in
regulations, been directed at actual or potential customers of the
other related party.
(7) Exception for Small and Mid-Size Taxpayers. Notwithstanding
any other provision of this section, and except as the Secretary shall
prescribe by regulation, if a taxpayer that is a related party has made
a reasonable effort in good faith to comply with the provisions of
this subsection, and if the combined gross income of the taxpayer
52. Regulations should provide that the apportionment function prescribed
in subparagraph (J) should follow the system of "apportionment keys" (e.g.,
apportionment by such factors as sales, payroll, headcount, or some other reasonable
indicator of relative benefit) that is currently prescribed in the regulations under §
482 governing the pricing of services among related parties.
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and of all related parties with respect to such taxpayer does not
exceed $5 million dollars, then the Secretary may distribute,
apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or
allowances between or among such related parties under this section
only if such related party, in establishing pricing for or otherwise
arranging transactions among such related parties, had as a principal
purpose avoiding taxes imposed by this chapter.
(8) Exception for Interest Expense. Notwithstanding any other
provision of this section, and except as provided in regulations, in
determining whether the test of subsection (a) is met, expenses for
interest shall not be treated as expenses but instead shall be
apportioned among related parties (whether or not such related
parties are engaged together in an activity described in this
subsection) in a manner that is consistent with the rules for
determining the source of such expenses in parts I and II of
subchapter N of this chapter and the regulations prescribed
thereunder.
(9) Coordination with Treaties. The Secretary shall apply the rules of
this subsection in determining, under any income tax treaty to which
the United States is a party, whether a related party's income is
attributable to a permanent establishment, or whether conditions are
made or imposed between two enterprises in their commercial or
financial relations that differ from those that would be made between
independent enterprises, or in applying any similar standard
contained in any such income tax treaty, except that the competent
authority may, pursuant to any such treaty, agree to a resolution of a
matter that is not consistent with the rules of this subparagraph if the
competent authority determines that such resolution is necessary to
prevent double taxation and is consistent with sound tax
administration.
(10) Treatment of Payments Among Related Parties. Except as
provided in regulations, payments made among related parties during
a taxable year, other than contributions to capital or distributions
53. Regulations may provide exceptions to the rule of this subparagraph for
situations in which interest expense is identified with particular elements of a related
party's operations, or in which the amount of interest expense incurred by a related
party or group of related parties is sufficiently small that an exception is warranted
by considerations of sound tax administration.
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with respect to a person's ownership interest in a corporation,
partnership or other entity, shall be treated as -
(A) payments in compensation for services, to the extent of
the markup described in subparagraph (b)(1)(A) (or such
other markup as may be provided in regulations) on the
payee's direct and indirect expenses with respect to the
services provided or reasonably apportionable to the payer;
(B) payments for the purchase of tangible property, to the
extent consistent with (i) the valuation of any tangible
property transferred among such related parties for purposes
of compliance with United States customs laws or other
United States laws requiring valuation of such property; (ii)
if no United States laws require valuation of such property,
the valuation determined in good faith for purposes of the
customs or other laws of another country; or (iii) if no laws
of any country require valuation of such property, the
valuation of such property determined in good faith by the
taxpayer, with such valuation to be adjusted by the Secretary
for purposes of this subparagraph only if unreasonable;
(C) payments for the purchase of stock or securities, other
financial instruments, interests in real property, or other
identifiable interests in property other than intangible
property described in section 936(h)(3)(B), to the extent of
the fair market value of such interests in property based on
the valuation of such interests determined in good faith by
the taxpayer, taking into account reasonably available
information such as that provided by public securities
exchanges, with such valuation to be adjusted by the
Secretary for purposes of this subparagraph only if
unreasonable;
(D) payments of interest, to the extent of interest on bona
fide indebtedness determined at the applicable federal rate,
or at a reasonably corresponding market rate of interest in
the case of bona fide indebtedness that is denominated in a
foreign currency;
(E) payments for the purchase of intangible property
described in section 936(h)(3)(B), provided that the transfer
of such property constitutes a purchase rather than a license
under this chapter, to the extent of the valuation of such
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intangible property determined in good faith by the taxpayer,
with such valuation to be adjusted by the Secretary for
purposes of this subparagraph only if unreasonable;
and, to the extent not otherwise accounted for under this
subparagraph, shall be treated as
(F) royalties for the use of intangible property described in
section 936(h)(3))(B).
(11) Definitions - For purposes of this subsection, except as
otherwise provided in regulations -
(A) Activity - An "activity" shall mean a group of functions
related to the conduct of a particular trade or business (or to
a particular purpose described in subsections (1) and (2) of
section 212), to which two or more related parties contribute,
determined at the largest level of aggregation of functions
performed that will permit reliable identification of such
related parties' respective contributions to the functions
comprising an activity.54 The Secretary may modify a
taxpayer's designation of an activity only if such
modification is necessary to correct a significant failure
reasonably to reflect related parties' relative contributions to
the functions comprising an activity.ss
(B) Participation in an Activity - A related party shall be
treated as participating in an activity if such related party
performs services, engages in manufacturing, or otherwise
engages in economic activity in support of the activity,
except that such related party shall not be treated as
participating in such activity if such related party's
contribution to the activity is of an insubstantial and
incidental nature. The Secretary shall prescribe regulations
54. Regulations should specify that the boundaries of an "activity" can be
determined in part by the geographic scope of the activity, in keeping with
operational divisions maintained in the taxpayer's business.
55. In general, a failure reasonably to reflect related parties' relative
contributions to the functions comprising an activity should be considered significant
only if the taxpayer has not exercised due diligence and reasonable care in
determining such relative contributions, or if the correction of the taxpayer's
determination will increase or decrease a party's income subject to taxation by at
least the greater of 1% of such income or $300,000.
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specifying circumstances under which contributions will be
treated as being of an insubstantial and incidental nature.56
(C) Expenses - For purposes of this subsection, except as
otherwise provided in regulations or in the second sentence
of this subparagraph, expenses shall include (i) costs of a
kind for which a deduction is allowed under section 162s5
and (ii) allowances of depreciation and amortization. Except
as otherwise provided in regulations, amounts that are
incurred in connection with the manufacture of property or
the purchase of property for resale, which do not constitute
either (i) the cost of tangible property purchased for resale,
(ii) tangible property that is incorporated in or consumed in
the process of manufacturing, or (iii) costs of property for
which an allowance of depreciation or amortization is
permitted, and that would be described in the preceding
sentence except that they are capitalized in the cost of
inventory, also shall be treated as expenses for purposes of
this subsection.
(D) Party and Related Party - A "party" shall mean any
organization, trade, or business as those terms are used in
subsection (a), and a "related party" shall mean any of two
or more such parties (whether or not incorporated, whether
or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
same interests.
(E) Resident for Income Tax Purposes - Except as otherwise
provided in regulations,. a person is resident for income tax
56. It is suggested that such regulations specify that a related party's
contribution to a particular activity will be treated as insubstantial and incidental if
the expenses associated with the contribution do not exceed 2% of the related party's
total expenses.
57. Thus, for example, the purchase price of stock or securities or other
financial instruments acquired for any purpose generally will not constitute an
"'expense."
58. For example, a distributor of washing machines may purchase the
machines and also incur such expenses as depreciation on a warehouse in which the
machines are stored, and overhead costs associated with the distribution activities,
which under § 263A must be capitalized in the distributor's inventory costs. The
depreciation and overhead costs, but not the costs of purchasing the washing
machines, are treated as "expenses" for purposes of this subsection.
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purposes in a country in which its income is subject to
taxation, under such country's laws, by reason of such
person's residence in such country.59
(c) Rules Applicable to Related Parties Resident for Income Tax Purposes in
the Same Country. - The Secretary shall provide regulations governing the
application of subsection (a) to the activities of related parties that are
resident in the same country.6 0
(d) Rulings - The Secretary may, in the Secretary's discretion, issue rulings
to particular taxpayers setting forth, by agreement with such taxpayers, the
manner in which compliance with the rules of this section shall be
determined, including but not limited to how expenses or revenues shall be
apportioned among activities, and which operations shall be included in a
particular activity. Any such rulings shall extend for specified terms not to
exceed five years, although they may in the Secretary's discretion be
renewed. Such rulings and background file documents related to such rulings
shall be open to public inspection subject to the rules of section 6110(a) and
such limitations on public inspection as are provided under this chapter.
(e) Regulations - The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section, including
but not limited to regulations providing for modification of the factor
described in subparagraph (b)(I)(A)(i) for use in connection with activities
performed in particular industries or in particular geographic locations, to the
extent the Secretary believes such modification is necessary to adjust for
59. Regulations should address the application of this subsection to parties
that are resident for income tax purposes in more than one country.
60. This provision would be applicable, for example, with respect to the
division of income between taxable and tax-exempt affiliates within the United
States, and among members of affiliated groups filing consolidated returns (to the
extent that their separate incomes may be relevant for federal income tax purposes).
It is anticipated that regulations under this provision will, to the extent feasible, rely
on principles similar to those prescribed with respect to related parties that are
resident for income tax purposes in different countries. In particular, it is anticipated
that such regulations will provide for the review of arrangements for the provision of
services between related parties based on cost-based pricing methodologies. It also
is anticipated that regulations will, to the greatest extent feasible, rely on the
apportionments of income and expenses set forth in the taxpayer's accounting
records, provided those records follow generally accepted accounting principles and
have not been compiled with a principal purpose of tax avoidance.
61. It is suggested that enactment of this language be accompanied by
repeal of §§ 6103(b)(2) and 61 10(b)(1)(B) (exempting advance pricing agreements
from public inspection).
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substantially differing expected returns on cost from business activities
conducted in such industries or locations.
Examples:
Example I - Parentco engages with subsidiaries in different
countries in the manufacture and distribution of cars, light trucks, and heavy
trucks, as well as parts for those vehicles. Parentco and the subsidiaries all
participate in research and development, manufacturing and distribution
associated with the cars, light trucks, and heavy trucks. In general, the
companies trade among themselves in intermediate goods and finished
products relating to cars, light trucks, and heavy trucks, and make available
to one another without charge the results of all research and development
that they perform.
Parentco and its subsidiaries organize their books and records,
establish research and development and marketing budgets, and organize
reporting lines for their personnel by reference to two divisions, (i) cars and
light trucks, and (ii) heavy trucks. In general, research and development
activities performed by personnel assigned to the cars and light trucks
division is expected to benefit the manufacture of both cars and light trucks
but to provide only minor and incidental benefits with respect to the
production of heavy trucks; and research and development performed by
personnel assigned to the heavy trucks division is expected to provide only
insubstantial and incidental benefits with respect to the production of cars
and light trucks.
The Parentco group has been manufacturing and distributing cars
and light trucks for many years, and sales in those product lines have been
highly profitable. The group only recently, however, has begun the
manufacture and distribution of heavy trucks and to date has incurred
operating margins from the sales of heavy trucks significantly lower than the
margins achieved from sales of cars and light trucks. In addition, the
percentage of revenues derived from heavy trucks varies substantially from
country to country.
The management of the Parentco group reasonably believes that
accounting for the manufacture and distribution of cars and light trucks will
permit will permit reliable identification of each group member's respective
contributions to the derivation of profits from those vehicles, whereas
accounting on an aggregate basis for the manufacture and distribution of
cars, light trucks and heavy trucks will overstate the apparent contributions
of those entities that contribute disproportionately to the manufacture and
sale of heavy trucks.
The manufacture and sale of cars and light trucks and related parts,
and the manufacture and sale of heavy trucks and related parts, will each be
treated as separate "activities" for purposes of paragraph (b).
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Example 2 - The facts are the same as in Example I except that in
addition Parentco organizes its distribution activities geographically and
maintains separate distribution organizations, in both its car and light truck
and heavy truck divisions, that are responsible for sales of each category of
vehicle and related parts in three regions: (i) the Americas, (ii)
Europe/Middle East/Africa, and (iii) Rest of World. Although a number of
entities in Parentco's global group participate in the design, manufacture and
sale of vehicles in two or all regions, some of such entities are engaged in
operations relating only to particular regions. In general, Parentco maintains
accounting records for both its car and light truck and heavy truck divisions
by geographic region. The manufacture and sale of (i) cars and light trucks,
and (ii) heavy trucks, and of parts in each category, each will be treated as
consisting of three different activities corresponding to the three regions
according to which Parentco organizes its operations.
Example 3 - Techco engages with its subsidiaries in different
countries in the manufacture and distribution of human pharmaceuticals,
animal medications, and toiletries. Techco and the subsidiaries all participate
in research and development, manufacturing and distribution related to
human pharmaceuticals and animal medications, and exchange technical
results among themselves on a regular basis. No member of the group,
however, engages in research and development relating to toiletries.
Members of the group do not trade with one another in tangible property.
(That is, each group member arranges for the manufacture or purchase of all
product that it sells.)
Techco and its subsidiaries organize their books and records,
establish research and development and marketing budgets, and organize
reporting lines for their personnel by reference to three divisions: (i) human
pharmaceuticals, (ii) animal medications, and (iii) toiletries. Separate
research departments engage in research relating to human pharmaceuticals
and animal medications. Although on occasion a product developed for use
in humans has proven useful with respect to animals, and vice versa, the
research operations of the human pharmaceutical and animal medication
divisions provide only insubstantial and incidental benefits to each other.
Profit margins on the three different categories of products manufactured by
members of the Techco group vary significantly, both among themselves and
among countries; relative sales volumes of the different categories of
products also vary significantly among countries.
The management of the Techco group reasonably believes that
accounting for the manufacture and distribution of human pharmaceuticals,
animal medications, and toiletries separately will permit reliable
identification of each group member's respective contributions to the
derivation of profits from those product lines. The management of the
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Techco group considered whether different categories of human
pharmaceuticals should be considered as separate activities for purposes of
section 482(b), but reasonably determined that the pharmaceutical industry
as a whole depends on the funding of a wide variety of research and
development products, only a few of which are likely to be successful. The
management of the Techco group therefore reasonably concluded that
measuring the profitability of a human pharmaceutical business generally
requires reference to its success with respect to multiple categories of
products, and that treating the manufacture and distribution of different
categories of human pharmaceuticals as separate activities, for purposes of
section 482(b), was likely to distort measurement of the contributions made
by the different related parties to the success of the business. The
manufacture and distribution of human pharmaceuticals, animal medications,
and toiletries will be treated as separate activities (or separate groups of
activities, if further geographic breakdown is appropriate) for purposes of
section 482(b).
Example 4 - The Investco group provides financial planning services
to individuals, and also conducts brokerage operations, through a network of
subsidiaries resident around the world. Several of the subsidiaries conduct
research operations. These include efforts by personnel to develop computer-
based tools for predicting clients' financial needs and developing financial
plans for their use. Although applicable laws governing, for example,
retirement planning differ from country to country, and some development
efforts are useful only in particular countries, the financial planning staffs
located in different countries engage in significant exchanges of planning
techniques. Research operations also seek to identify improved techniques
for computer-based trading of securities, and these operations benefit
brokerage activities around the world. The relative revenues derived from
brokerage activities and from financial planning services vary significantly
from country to country. Management of the Investco group reasonably
believes that accounting separately for brokerage and financial planning
operations is necessary to permit reliable identification of each group
member's respective contributions to the derivation of profits from those two
components of the group's business. The brokerage and the financial
planning operations will both be treated as "activities" for purposes of
section 482(b) (or as separate groups of activities that are subdivided into
activities along geographic lines).
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